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INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, PUBLIC  
ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS, AND THE LEGACY OF  
HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL, INC. v. UNITED STATES 
LINDA C. MCCLAIN*
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
In this Article, I look at two contrasting ways in which arguments 
about the Thirteenth Amendment’s declaration that “[n]either sla-
very nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States” 
featured in the enactment of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 
and in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,2 the case in which the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the Act.  First, the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude makes a brief ap-
pearance in Heart of Atlanta Motel as an unsuccessful basis on which 
the motel owner challenged Title II.3  A similar claim arose in Con-
gress when some lawmakers argued that the Thirteenth Amendment 
posed an “insurmountable constitutional barrier” to a federal public 
accommodations law because it compelled service.4
 
Copyright © 2011 by Linda C. McClain. 
  The second role 
played by the Thirteenth Amendment (barely discernible in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel but more evident in the congressional debates over Title 
* Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of 
Law.  This Article grew out of a paper I presented at the the 2011 Maryland Constitutional 
Law Schmooze on the Thirteenth Amendment, held on February 25 & 26.  Thanks to or-
ganizer Mark Graber and to participants for helpful comments, and, in particular, to Gar-
rett Epps and Rebecca Zietlow for pointing me toward additional research sources.  I am 
also grateful to Joseph Singer for insightful comments. Stefanie Weigmann, Head of Legal 
Information Services, Pappas Library, and BU law students Darian Butcher and Hallie Ma-
rin provided valuable assistance with research.  Comments are welcome: lmcclain@bu.edu. 
 1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000a–a6 (2006)).  For a detailed account of the legislative debates and political strug-
gles that preceded the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title II, in particular, 
see THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL 
SEGREGATION (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997); CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST 
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).  
 2. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).  The Thirteenth Amendment states: “Neither slavery nor invo-
luntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 3. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261. 
 4. S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 53 (1964) (Individual Views of Senator Strom Thurmond). 
McClainFinalBookProof-NEW 12/7/2011  10:17 AM 
84 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:83 
II) was as a constitutional base for a public accommodations law be-
cause denial of service on the basis of race is a badge of servitude and 
a vestige of slavery.5
When the Heart of Atlanta Motel owner’s challenge to the consti-
tutionality of Title II reached the United States Supreme Court, the 
Court unanimously affirmed Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate private conduct through a civil rights statute affect-
ing public accommodations.  In so doing, the Court distinguished its 
own (in)famous precedent, the Civil Rights Cases,
 
6 in which it held 
that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments could not sustain 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, an earlier public accommodations law, 
both because denial of equal accommodations was not a “badge of 
slavery” or “involuntary servitude,” and because the Act reached pri-
vate, not state, action.7  As Congress, eighty years later, considered 
passing a new public accommodations law, that case posed a formida-
ble constitutional obstacle.  Thus, the Administration and Congress 
relied primarily on Congress’s power to regulate commerce and se-
condarily on the Fourteenth Amendment.8  In defending the law be-
fore the Court, the United States, in turn, relied on the commerce 
power, allowing the Court to avoid considering whether “the remain-
ing authority upon which [Congress] acted was . . . adequate.”9  Non-
etheless, the Thirteenth Amendment featured as a foundation for 
such a law in congressional hearings and reports on the urgent need 
for a national law ending discrimination in access to public accom-
modations and the need for Congress to complete the unfinished 
business begun by the Reconstruction Amendments.10  Conversely, 
prominent congressional opponents of Title II argued that reliance 
on the Thirteenth Amendment was “misplaced,” and that Title II 
would enact involuntary servitude.11
This Article examines how these contrasting ideas about the rela-
tionship between the Thirteenth Amendment and a public accom-
modations law—that it, on one hand, barred such a law, and, on the 
other, that it justified such a law—featured in Heart of Atlanta Motel 
 
 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 7. Id. at 11, 24–26 (“[W]e are forced to the conclusion that such an act of refusal has 
nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude.”). 
 8. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (noting that the legislature realized that 
the objectives of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “could be readily achieved” through using the 
commerce power granted to Congress in the Constitution). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 11. See infra Part III.E. 
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and in the passage of Title II itself.  Looking back at these contrasting 
invocations of the Thirteenth Amendment may be useful to contem-
porary examinations of congressional authority to secure freedom 
and equality, as well as to contemporary debates over the justifications 
for and proper scope of antidiscrimination laws, and what is at stake 
for persons protected by such laws and those challenging them. 
Part II of this Article explicates the Heart of Atlanta Motel case.  
The motel owner challenged the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on several 
grounds: that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce 
Clause, and that the Act violated his Fifth Amendment liberty and 
property rights, as well as (improbably) the Thirteenth Amendment.12  
These grounds reflected a particular conception of private property 
rights rejected by the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel and, prior to that, 
by Congress and the executive in supporting Title II: that someone 
who used his private property to operate a business had the liberty to 
serve—or refuse to serve—whomever he pleased and to compel him 
to serve was “involuntary servitude.”13  To convey to readers some-
thing of the context and historical significance of this case, I augment 
the case exposition with newspaper coverage of the motel owner’s le-
gal challenge to Title II and its journey to the Supreme Court, as well 
as some contemporaneous legal commentary on the case.14  Part II al-
so situates the case with two other Title II cases announced the same 
day, Katzenbach v. McClung15 and Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,16
Part III turns from the Court’s upholding of Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act to Congress’s deliberations about it, and considers the con-
trasting appeals to the Thirteenth Amendment in arguments made 
 and with 
the lawsuit brought against Atlanta restaurant owner Lester Maddox.  
In explicating the case, I highlight several features of the majority and 
concurring opinions with resonance for subsequent antidiscrimina-
tion laws and challenges to them.  Although private property objec-
tions to public accommodations laws continue to surface, a newer 
generation of challenges to antidiscrimination law emphasizes First 
Amendment claims to religious liberty or freedom of association.  
 
 12. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243–44. 
 13. See infra Parts II.D, III.B, III.E. 
 14. My sampling of press coverage draws on archives of national newspapers available 
at Boston University’s library and on archives of several southern newspapers available at 
Harvard University’s library.  Thanks to my research assistant Hallie Marin for retrieving 
these sources.  I thank my former colleague John DeWitt Gregory for suggesting that I 
look at contemporary news coverage, something he and Joanna Grossman did in their in-
formative article, The Legacy of Loving, 51 HOW. L.J. 15 (2007). 
 15. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 16. 379 U.S. 306 (1964). 
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both for and against the public accommodations law.  This look at the 
legislative record is important because reading the case in isolation 
from this legislative record would leave a reader ignorant of just how 
strongly concerns for rectifying an intolerable injustice that should 
have ended long ago animated executive and legislative support for 
Title II.  Thus, a significant part of the legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel 
is simply the fact that the Court did uphold this new federal law so 
that it did not meet the fate of its 1875 predecessor.17
In Part IV, I look at how certain themes in Heart of Atlanta Motel 
recur in subsequent Supreme Court cases.  An instructive example is 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
  Part III con-
cludes by noting that recent commemorations of the Civil Rights Act 
speak of Congress completing important unfinished business, even as 
some dissenting voices continue to object to the law’s incursion on li-
berty and property rights. 
18 in which, twenty years later, the Court 
upheld a state public accommodations law and cited Heart of Atlanta 
Motel when it analogized the dignitary harms of exclusion based on 
race to those based on sex.19  In contrast, later Supreme Court cases, 
such as United States v. Lopez20 and United States v. Morrison,21
In the Conclusion, I turn briefly to present day arguments that 
are critical of the expansive scope of current public accommodations 
law, particularly when the inclusion of sexual orientation as a pro-
tected category appears to threaten religious liberty and freedom of 
expressive association.  Opponents of such laws may not appeal to the 
Thirteenth Amendment, but they do use the language of being forced 
or compelled to render service in violation of conscience.  At the 
heart of this contemporary debate is the extent to which race is a spe-
cial case and to which this important precedent about eradicating 
race discrimination is—and is not—a helpful template for remedying 
sex and sexual orientation discrimination.  
 distin-
guish Heart of Atlanta Motel in troubling ways, marking a much-
commented upon shift away from the Court’s deference to Congress’s 
expansive use of its commerce power to remedy moral evils that hind-
er equality.  
 
 17. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 18. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 19. Id. at 625, 628–29.   
 20. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 21. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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II.  REVISITING HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL, INC. V. UNITED STATES 
A.  The Legal Challenges to Title II in Context 
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, a motel operator 
challenged the constitutionality of the newly enacted Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides, in relevant part: “All persons 
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, servic-
es, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place 
of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrim-
ination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin.”22  The definition of public accommodation included, 
among “establishments . . . which serve[] the public,” “any inn, hotel, 
motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient 
guests, other than an establishment located within a building which 
contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is ac-
tually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his resi-
dence.”23
Title II also reaches “‘discrimination or segregation’ . . . sup-
ported by state action,” which means “when carried on under color of 
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or any custom or usage re-
quired or enforced by officials of the State or any of its subdivisions.”
   
24
[T]hat all persons “shall be entitled to be free, at any estab-
lishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any 
kind on the ground of race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin, if such discrimination or segregation is or purports to 
be required by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, 
or order of a State or any agency or political subdivision the-
reof.”
  
Thus, the law contains an affirmative declaration: 
25
 
 22. 379 U.S. 241, 247 (1964) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
§ 201(a), 78 Stat. 241, 243) (intenal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 23. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act, § 201(b), 78 Stat. at 243) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The “so-called ‘Mrs. Murphy’s Boarding House’” exemption was a “congres-
sional concession to a reductio ad absurdum”—even before the public accommodations sec-
tion of the Civil Rights Act was written, opponents of President Kennedy’s directive to 
Congress to pass such an act “appealed to the emotions by painting a vivid portrait of the 
ancient widow operating a three or four room tourist home who would, by force of the 
bill, be required to accommodate transients without regard to race.”  Harry T. Quick, Pub-
lic Accommodations: A Justification of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 
660, 672 (1965). 
 24. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 248 (quoting Civil Rights Act, § 201(d), 78 Stat. at 
243). 
 25. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act, § 202, 78 Stat. at 244). 
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Title II contained various exceptions, including for private clubs un-
der certain conditions.26
On July 2, 1964, just “2 hours and 10 minutes after President 
Johnson signed” the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Moreton Rolleston, pres-
ident and operator of the Heart of Atlanta Motel, filed his challenge 
to Title II in federal district court in Atlanta.
 
27  Rolleston, an attorney, 
represented himself in the legal challenge, including arguing before 
the Supreme Court.28  Contemporary press reports noted that “[t]he 
Heart of Atlanta Motel has been the target of repeated demonstra-
tions and sit-ins by Negro and white civil rights workers.”29  As the 
Court recounted (and as newspapers confirm), “[p]rior to passage of 
the Act the motel had followed a practice of refusing to rent rooms to 
Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continue to do so.  In an 
effort to perpetuate that policy this suit was filed.”30 Rolleston argued 
“that Congress in passing this Act exceeded its power to regulate 
commerce.”31  He asserted additional constitutional claims: the law 
deprived the motel “of the right to choose its customers and operate 
its business as it wishes, resulting in a taking of its liberty and property 
without due process of law and a taking of its property without just 
compensation.”32  Rolleston “asked $11 million in damages” (in the 
event he had to comply with the law), contending that desegregation 
“would ruin his business, reputation and goodwill.”33  Pertinent to this 
symposium’s topic, he also alleged that Congress subjected the motel 
to “involuntary servitude,” violating the Thirteenth Amendment.34
“Involuntary servitude” was also a cry of Lester Maddox, owner of 
the Atlanta-based Pickrick Restaurant and the target of a lawsuit 
brought under Title II by three Negro
  
35
 
 26. Civil Rights Act, § 201(e), 78 Stat. at 243–44.  
 ministers, Rev. George Willis 
 27. Atlanta Motel Sues in Major Test of Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1964, at 1. 
 28. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 242 (noting that Moreton Rolleston, Jr., 
represents the appellant). 
 29. Hotelier Brings $11 Million Rights Action, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 1964, at 7. 
 30. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243. 
 31. Id. at 243–44.   
 32. Id.   
 33. Atlanta Motel Sues in Major Test of Rights Act, supra note 27, at 1.  One million dollars 
was for deprivation of property rights, and $10 million for deprivation of his liberty right 
to refuse service.  Id. 
 34. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 244. 
 35. The terms “Negro” and “Negroes,” rather than African-American or black, are the 
terms employed in the historical materials that I discuss in this article.  Therefore, I use 
these terms when I quote or paraphrase sources.  “Negro” was “the standard preferential 
term” used by blacks from the early twentieth century to “until the late 1960s,” when 
“‘Black,’ and now perhaps . . . ‘African American’” became the “preferred term.”  Tom W. 
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Jr., Rev. Woodrow T. Lewis, and Rev. Albert Dunn. Although the ul-
timate companion case to Heart of Atlanta Motel was Katzenbach v. 
McClung, which upheld Title II against a challenge brought by Ollie’s 
Barbeque, the initial pairing in the press was with a lawsuit brought by 
Willis, Lewis, and Dunn against Maddox for refusing to comply with 
Title II. On July 3, 1964, when these three men sought entrance to 
Maddox’s restaurant, Maddox proceeded to chase them away at gun-
point.36  In contemporary press coverage, Maddox appears as a de-
fiant and violent segregationist, brandishing axe handles against Ne-
groes who sought to enter his restaurant and rallying his white 
customers to join him in turning them away.37 Along with “home-style 
fare,” Maddox also offered up “homespun political commentary” 
through the voice of “Pickrick,” in “Pickrick Says” advertisements in 
the Atlanta Journal Constitution.38  Atlanta Mayor Ivan Allen testified in 
Congress in support of Title II and many Atlanta businesses desegre-
gated before its passage. By contrast, Maddox’s Pickrick remained 
“stubbornly wedded to the segregationist Jim Crow policies;” his res-
taurant became “a conspicuous symbol of segregationist defiance,” 
and “an immediate target of civil rights activists seeking to test the 
new law.”39
 
Smith, Changing Racial Labels: From “Colored” to “Negro” to “Black” to “African American,” 56 
PUBLIC OPINION Q. 496, 476–97 (1992).  The term had “considerable handicaps to over-
come,” since it “tended to be used as a term of reproach by Whites and suffered from its 
association” with certain racial epithets.  Id. at 498.  However, it was “defined to stand for a 
new way of thinking about Blacks”: “Racial progress and the hopes and aspirations of 
Blacks (especially as illustrated by [Booker T.] Washington’s self-help ideology) were to be 
captured by the term ‘Negro,’ and old racial patterns in general and Southern racial tradi-
tions in particular were to be left behind with “Colored.’”  Martin Luther King Jr.’s  “I 
Have a Dream” speech in 1963 “favored the term ‘Negro,’” and used the term “Black” as 
an adjective and only in parallel construction with White.”  Nonetheless, “as the civil rights 
movement began making tangible progress,” some argued that a new term, “Black,” was 
needed to “shed the remnants of slavery and racial serfdom.”  Id. at 499–501.  
  A radio station employee introduced a transcript into the 
district court proceedings in which Maddox vehemently expressed his 
scorn for desegregation and its advocates: “This property belongs to 
me, my wife and my children.  The white people have got enough of 
 36. Black Upholds Rights Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 11, 1964, at 1 (quoting Maddox); 
U.S. Seeks to Join Atlanta Suit on Enforcement of Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1964, at 17 (re-
porting incident). 
 37. United Press International, Atlanta Restaurant Defies High Court, Again Bars Negroes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1964, at 1.  In sharp contrast, contemporary press reports depict Mr. 
Rolleston as an hotelier and attorney who opposed the law, but after an initial federal 
court ruling against him, announced he would comply with it pending the appeal.  Id.  
 38. Government & Politics: Lester Maddox (1915–2003), THE NEW GEORGIA 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (April 4, 2004), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article/ 
jsp?id=h-1387.  
 39. Id. 
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this and it’s not because of the Negroes.  It’s because of renegades 
like Lyndon Johnson and Ivan Allen.”40
The Department of Justice successfully moved to intervene in the 
lawsuit against Maddox’s restaurant as well as for the appointment of 
a three-judge panel (or, as the Boston Globe put it, “a three-man Feder-
al court”) to have a prompt hearing of the challenges to Title II.
   
41  On 
July 22, 1964, the panel upheld Title II and issued injunctions against 
Heart of Atlanta Motel and the Pickrick Restaurant.42  The court 
stayed the injunction until August 11 to allow time for direct appeal to 
the Supreme Court.43
The restaurant and motel owners announced that they would ab-
ide by the order, but as August 11 approached, they appealed to Jus-
tice Hugo L. Black for an order staying enforcement of the injunction 
until final action by the Supreme Court, on the ground that, other-
wise, their businesses would be irreparably injured. Justice Black 
turned down the request, triggering Maddox’s public remark about 
involuntary servitude: “We are just really hurt that our government 
will tell us that we no longer can be free as Americans and no longer 
can we select our customers.  It’s involuntary servitude; it’s slavery of 
the first order; it shows contempt, utter disregard for the United 
States Constitution.”
  
44  He vowed: “We will never integrate. Pickrick 
will never integrate.”45
 
 40. E. W. Kenworthy, 2 Rights Act Suits Argued in Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1964, at 20.  
On Title II’s passage, Mayor Allen urged Atlantans to obey the law, while also urging At-
lanta Negroes to “use their ‘new rights in such a manner as to create the least possible in-
convenience, disorder, or hurt feelings.’”  Marion Gaines, Mayor Asks Restraint by Negroes, 
ATLANTA CONST., July 3, 1964, at 1. 
  On August 11, Maddox, “armed with a pistol 
and backed by 200 cheering whites, defied the nation’s new Civil 
Rights Law again by . . . turning three Negroes away from his restau-
rant,” shouting “You’re dirty Communists and you’ll never get a piece 
 41. Early Hearing for Test Case, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 1964, at 2. 
 42. Achsah Posey, Federal Court Orders Maddox and Motel to Serve Negroes, ATLANTA 
CONST., July 23, 1964, at 1.  In addition to running this front-page story with a large head-
line, the Atlanta Constitution also published the text of the rulings: Text of Verdict on Pickrick: 
‘Congress Can Deal with Bias,’ ATLANTA CONST., July 23, 1964, at 18; Text of Decision on Suit by 
Motel, ATLANTA CONST., July 23, 1964, at 18.  
 43. Three Judges Reject Cafe, Motel Attack: Court Holds off Injunctions to Allow Appeal, CHI. 
TRIB., July 23, 1964, at 1.  
 44. Black Upholds Rights Law, supra note 36, at 1.  Maddox also asserted: “I’m so shocked 
that I’ve got to forego my rights under the Constitution to satisfy the agitators and the at-
torney general.”  Achsah Posey, Motel to Comply with Order but Maddox Is Undecided, ATLANTA 
CONST., Aug. 11, 1964, at 1, 6 (quoting Maddox) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45. Won’t Block Rights Law: Black Refuses to Halt Enforcement, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 1964, at 
12 (quoting Maddox) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of fried chicken here.”46  After the U.S. Attorney General obtained an 
order from federal court requiring Maddox to show why he should 
not be held in civil contempt for this refusal of service,47 Maddox 
closed Pickrick restaurant “for good.”48  Crying, Maddox blamed the 
President, Congress, and the Communists for closing his business and 
ending “a childhood dream,” and then, addressing the gathered 
crowd at length, he “cit[ed] numerous passages of Scripture.”  By 
contrast, Rolleston, owner of the Heart of Atlanta Motel, said he 
would obey the court.49
In denying the request for a stay, Justice Black’s memorandum 
referred to the power to grant a stay as an “awesome responsibility 
calling for the upmost circumspection in its exercise,” all the more so 
when a single member of the Court “is asked to delay the will of Con-
gress to put its policies into effect at the time it desires.”
 
50  Justice 
Black, news reports emphasized, said the Civil Rights Act did not re-
sult from sudden, impulsive action, but “represented the culmination 
of one of the most thoroughgoing debates in the history of Con-
gress.”51  Justice Black stated “that ‘a judicial restraint of enforcement 
of one of the most important sections of the Civil Rights Act would, in 
my judgment, be unjustifiable.’”52  Declining to address the constitu-
tionality of the particular provisions of the Civil Rights Act under at-
tack, he nonetheless expressed his belief “that the broad grants of 
power to Congress in the Commerce Clause and the 14th Amend-
ment are enough to show that Congress does have at least general 
constitutional authority to control commerce among the states and to 
enforce the 14th Amendment’s policy against racial discrimination.”53
 
 46. United Press International, supra note 
  
Justice Black’s focus upon the Fourteenth Amendment alongside the 
Commerce Clause as a source of Congressional authority for the Civil 
Rights Act would set him (and some other Justices) apart from the 
majority when the Court actually ruled on the merits of the motel’s 
challenge.  
37, at 1.  
 47. Achsah Posey & Ted Simmons, Maddox Ordered into U.S. Court in Contempt Suit, 
ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 13, 1964, at 1. 
 48. Cafe Is Closed for Good, Maddox Cries After He Bars 2 Negroes at Door, ATLANTA CONST., 
Aug. 14, 1964, at 1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Black Upholds Civil Rights Law, supra note 36, at 2. 
 51. Id.; Rights Law Stay Denied by Black, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1964, at 24. 
 52. Rights Law Stay Denied by Black, supra note 51, at 24. 
 53. Id. 
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B.  Before the Supreme Court  
The Supreme Court agreed to hear oral argument on the motel’s 
challenge on the opening day of its fall term, departing from its usual 
practice in order to honor the request by both sides for a prompt 
hearing.54  The Court would also hear a challenge to Title II brought 
by owners of a different restaurant, Ollie’s Barbeque, a challenge sus-
tained by a three-judge panel of a federal district court in Birming-
ham, Alabama.55  In that challenge, owners Ollie McClung Sr. and his 
son Ollie Jr. alleged that their restaurant did not cater to transients, 
but to local customers (although not those living in the Negro neigh-
borhood where it was located, except through a “take-out service for 
Negroes”56) and, thus, was not engaged in interstate commerce.57  
They alleged that they would lose $200,000 annually if forced to serve 
Negroes.58
By contrast to Ollie’s Barbeque, whose connection to interstate 
commerce was not its clientele but the food “procured [by a local 
supplier] from outside the State,”
  
59 the Heart of Atlanta Motel clearly 
did business across state lines; not only through “national advertising” 
but also by accepting “convention trade from outside Georgia and 
approximately 75% of its registered guests [were] from out of State.”60  
Thus, if Title II was constitutional, it would clearly apply to the motel.  
Prior to passage of Title II, it “had followed a practice of refusing to 
rent rooms to Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continue to 
do so.”61  Defending Title II, the United States “counter[ed] that the 
unavailability to Negroes of adequate accommodation interferes sig-
nificantly with interstate travel,” and that the Commerce Clause em-
powers Congress “to remove such obstructions and restraints.”62
 
 54. Marjorie Hunter, Supreme Court to Speed Test Of Key Clause in the Rights Act, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1964, at 24.  By this time, the Pickrick Restaurant was not part of the hear-
ing because, as noted above, Maddox closed the restaurant rather than integrate. Subse-
quently, Maddox opened a segregated cafe, and, in 1966, amidst “widespread dissatisfac-
tion with desegregation,” became governor of Georgia.  See “Government & Politics,” supra 
note 
  
38. 
 55. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 (1964). 
 56. Id. at 296.   
 57. McClung v. Katzenbach, 233 F. Supp. 815, 817–18 n.3 (N.D. Ala. 1964), rev’d, 379 
U.S. 294 (1964). 
 58. Court Says Rights Law Invalid in Restaurant Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 18, 1964, at 8. 
 59. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 296. 
 60. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).   
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 244. 
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1.  The Involuntary Servitude Argument as Surprising Even Alice 
The United States also met Rolleston’s Thirteenth Amendment 
argument.  At oral argument, Rolleston elaborated his Thirteenth 
Amendment theory.  He cited Hodges v. United States, which held that 
involuntary servitude included “compulsory service of one to anoth-
er,”63 and stated that other cases “have held that if a person is forced 
to serve another in business ways,” such involuntary servitude violated 
the Thirteenth Amendment.64  The government labeled as “entirely 
frivolous” the contention that “an amendment directed to the aboli-
tion of human bondage and the removal of widespread disabilities as-
sociated with slavery places discrimination in public accommodations, 
beyond the reach of both federal and state law.”65  In the Justice De-
partment’s brief, filed by Solicitor General Archibald Cox and Assis-
tant Attorney General Burke Marshall, the Department argued: “No 
one can seriously contend that requiring a motel proprietor to ac-
commodate Negroes on the basis of equality with guests of other races 
so long as he chooses to stay in business is ‘akin to African slavery.’”66
At oral argument, Solicitor General Cox dismissed Rolleston’s 
argument in vivid terms, suggesting that it would surprise “Alice, . . . 
even at the end of her long journey through wonderland,” if she were 
told  
  
that the restaurants and other places of public accommoda-
tion in 33 states in the year 1964 are held in involuntary ser-
vitude and that the Anglo-American common law for centu-
ries has subjected to slavery innkeepers, hackmen, carriers, 
wharfage men, ferriers, all kinds of other people holding 
themselves out to serve the public.67
Elements of this rebuttal echo in the Court’s rejection of the motel’s 
involuntary servitude claim: 
  
As we have seen, 32 States prohibit racial discrimination in 
public accommodations.  These laws but codify the com-
mon-law innkeeper rule which long predated the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  It is difficult to believe that the Amendment 
was intended to abrogate this principle.  Indeed, the opi-
nion of the Court in the Civil Rights Cases is to the con-
 
 63. 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906), overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 
(1968). 
 64. Excerpts from Rights Cases Argument, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1964, at 24. 
 65. Id. 
 66. In Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1964, at 8. 
 67. Excerpts from Rights Cases Argument, supra note 64, at 24.    
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trary . . . it having noted with approval the laws of “all the 
States” prohibiting discrimination.  We could not say that 
the requirements of the Act in this regard are in any way 
“akin to African slavery.”68
Interestingly, for the proposition that the Act’s requirement is 
not “akin to African slavery,” the Court cited to Butler v. Perry, which 
upheld Florida’s long-standing law that “[e]very able-bodied male 
person” between twenty-one and forty-five was subject to working on 
the roads and bridges for several days each year against a Thirteenth 
Amendment challenge.
 
69  The Court’s reasoning was that such labor 
was “a part of the duty” that each man owed “to the public,” rooted in 
the common law, and that Congress surely did not mean, in enacting 
the Thirteenth Amendment, to introduce any “novel doctrine[s]” or 
“interdict” public duties: “The great purpose in view was liberty under 
the protection of effective government, not the destruction of the lat-
ter by depriving it of essential powers.”70
2.  What To Do About the Civil Rights Cases?  
  The Court seemed to be 
analogizing the public duties at issue in that earlier case to the public 
duties of innkeepers, similarly rooted in common law but codified by 
state statute and similarly unthreatened by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.  
The Court readily concluded that Title II was constitutional as an 
exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.71  But it 
first had to reckon with its previous decision in the Civil Rights Cases,72 
which struck down Congress’s 1875 public accommodations law (Civil 
Rights Act of 1875).73  The Court declared the Civil Rights Cases “in-
apposite and without precedential value” as to the constitutionality of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.74
 
 68. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261 (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 
(1916)). 
  To make this point, it contrasted the 
 69. Butler, 240 U.S. at 329–31. 
 70. Id. at 330, 333. 
 71. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250. 
 72. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 73. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3.  
 74. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250.  There is an enormous amount of scholarly 
literature—to which some authors in this symposium have made valuable contributions—
critical of the Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence that thwarted Congress’s efforts, 
through civil rights laws, to implement the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments.  See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999); Robert J. Kaczo-
rowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies 
the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 191–96 (2005); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revo-
McClainFinalBookProof-NEW 12/7/2011  10:17 AM 
2011] THE LEGACY OF HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL, INC. 95 
earlier civil rights public accommodations law with the present one: 
the former did not limit categories of affected business to those “im-
pinging upon interstate commerce,” while the new Act carefully did 
so, except where state action was involved (in which case the Four-
teenth Amendment provided Congress a constitutional hook).75
Moreover, that earlier Congress did not fully consider whether 
the commerce power provided support for the 1875 Act.  That Act, 
the Court explained, “was not ‘conceived’ in terms of the commerce 
power,” but rather, in terms of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments.
 
76  Thus, the earlier case is “devoid of authority 
for the proposition” that Congress lacks authority, under the Com-
merce Clause, “to regulate discriminatory practices now found sub-
stantially to affect interstate commerce.”  By contrast, the contempo-
rary Court’s decision upheld an Act that “explicitly relies upon the 
commerce power, and where the record is filled with testimony of ob-
structions and restraints resulting from the discriminations found to 
be existing.”77  Because it found the commerce power sufficient to 
uphold Title II, the Court neither considered the other grounds on 
which Congress relied nor addressed whether Congress had sufficient 
power to act under Section 5 or the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.78
Although the Court only obliquely acknowledged that its prede-
cessor, in the Civil Rights Cases, rejected the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments as constitutional pegs for the Civil Rights Act of 
1875, it is worth revisiting that treatment briefly.  The fate of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 before an earlier Supreme Court undeniably led 
the later Congress to find a less vulnerable constitutional peg for its 
public accommodations law.
  
79
 
lutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 
893–99 (1986); Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, 
71 MD. L. REV. 40 (2011).  Discussing that literature is beyond the scope of this paper. 
  As one contemporary defense of Title 
II put it, the Court’s earlier answer to the argument that “denial of 
access to places of public accommodation was a badge or incident of 
slavery” (and thus barred by the Thirteenth Amendment) was “ab-
 75. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250–51.   
 76. Id. at 251. 
 77. Id. at 252. 
 78. The Court states: “This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which it 
acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the 
commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone.”  Id. at 
250. 
 79. See, e.g., Quick, supra note 23, at 683; see infra Part III for discussion. 
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rupt”: “Justice Bradley dismissed the argument as ‘running the slavery 
argument into the ground.’”80
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of 
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable con-
comitants of that state, there must be some stage in the 
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere 
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and 
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in 
the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are pro-
tected.
  Justice Bradley further stated: 
81
In support, Justice Bradley observed that, prior to the abolition 
of slavery and enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, freedmen 
enjoyed “all the essential rights of life, liberty and property the same 
as white citizens,” but no one argued that it invaded their status as 
freedmen because of “discriminations in the enjoyment of accommo-
dations in inns, public conveyances and places of amusement.  Mere 
discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as 
badges of slavery.”
 
82  Nor did the Fourteenth Amendment ground the 
1875 law, since it reached only state laws or state action, not private 
discrimination.83  The Court noted that a remedy might be sought 
under state laws concerning innkeepers and public carriers, or, “[i]f 
the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination,” then Congress 
may afford a remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment.84
In a forceful and famous dissent, Justice Harlan contended that 
discrimination in access to public accommodations “is a badge of ser-
vitude the imposition of which Congress may prevent under its power, 
by appropriate legislation, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.”
 
85
 
 80. Quick, supra note 
  
Taking up the majority’s argument that Congress lacked authority 
under the Thirteenth Amendment “to adjust what may be called the 
social rights of men and races in the community,” he retorted that 
what is at stake are not “social rights,” but constitutional rights to civil 
23, at 683 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 19 
(1883)). 
 81. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 13 (“And so in the present case, until some state law has been passed, or 
some state action through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of cit-
izens sought to be protected by the fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the United 
States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called 
into activity, for the prohibitions of the amendment are against state laws and acts done 
under state authority.”). 
 84. Id. at 25. 
 85. Id. at 43 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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freedoms.86
The right, for instance, of a colored citizen to use the ac-
commodations of a public highway, upon the same terms as 
are permitted to white citizens is no more a social right than 
his right, under the law, to use the public streets of a city or 
a town, or a turnpike road, or a public market, or a post of-
fice, or his right to sit in a public building with others, of 
whatever race, for the purpose of hearing the political ques-
tions of the day discussed.
  Thus, the rights the 1875 Act endeavored to secure and 
protect are legal rights: 
87
Justice Harlan reminded the Court of the circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment and that it “did 
something more than to prohibit slavery as an institution;” it also “es-
tablished and decreed universal civil freedom throughout the United 
States.”
 
88  The Civil Rights Act of 1866 undertook to secure to all citi-
zens “those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil free-
dom;” because the institution of slavery “rested wholly upon the infe-
riority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their freedom necessarily 
involved immunity from, and protection against, all discrimination 
against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as 
belong to freemen of other races.”89  Justice Harlan stressed 
“[e]xemption from race discrimination in respect of the civil rights 
which are fundamental in citizenship in a republican government” as a 
new constitutional right, “with express power in Congress, by legisla-
tion, to enforce” it.90 Justice Harlan also concluded that public ac-
commodations are, in effect, agents of the state.  An innkeeper exer-
cises “a quasi public employment,” and “[t]he public nature of his 
employment forbids him from discriminating” based on race.91  Simi-
larly, licensing gives amusement a public status.92 Thus, he viewed the 
entities covered by the 1875 Act as “agents of the state.”93
 
 86. Id. at 59.    
  
 87. Id. at 59–60. 
 88. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). 
 89. Id. at 35, 36. 
 90. Id. at 56. 
 91. Id. at 40–41. 
 92. See id. at 41 (noting “that places of public amusement . . . are established and main-
tained under direct license of law [and] [t]he authority to establish and maintain them 
comes from the public”).   
 93. Id. at 58–59 (“In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and managers of 
places of public amusement are agents or instrumentalities of the State . . . .”). 
McClainFinalBookProof-NEW 12/7/2011  10:17 AM 
98 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:83 
Finally, tackling Justice Bradley’s reference to the man “emerged 
from slavery” who, after the aid of “beneficent legislation,” must cease 
to be a special favorite of the law, Justice Harlan countered: 
It is . . . scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the 
special favorite of the laws. . . .  What the nation, through 
Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that 
race, is . . . to secure and protect rights belonging to them as 
freemen and citizens . . . .  The one underlying purpose of 
congressional legislation has been to enable the black race 
to take the rank of mere citizens.94
Justice Harlan continued by analyzing forms of class tyranny in the 
nation’s history, suggesting that “[t]o-day, it is the colored race which 
is denied, by corporations and individuals wielding public authority, 
rights fundamental in their freedom and citizenship.”
 
95
3.  Congress Reenters the Civil Rights Field 
  As I discuss in 
Part III, both Justice Bradley’s and Justice Harlan’s opinions featured 
prominently in Congressional consideration of Title II. 
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court did not explicitly revisit this 
earlier disagreement between the majority in the Civil Rights Cases and 
Justice Harlan, in dissent, over the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  It did note one consequence of the Civil Rights Cases: 
the long hiatus between when Congress enacted the first Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and, nearly a century later, when it enacted the series of 
civil rights acts in the late 1950s and early 1960s.96  How and when did 
Congress reenter the field? The Court detailed the legislative history 
of the modern Civil Rights Act, beginning with President Kennedy’s 
call for civil rights legislation, and the stated purpose of the proposed 
bill he sent Congress: “‘to promote the general welfare by eliminating 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin in . . . 
public accommodations through the exercise by Congress of the 
powers conferred upon it . . . to enforce the provisions of the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments . . . .’”97
As finally adopted, the Court observed, the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, of which Title II was a part, “was most comprehensive, undertak-
ing to prevent through peaceful and voluntary settlement discrimina-
tion in voting, as well as in places of accommodation and public facili-
 
 
 94. Id. at 61. 
 95. Id. at 62. 
 96. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964). 
 97. Id. (alterations in both) (citations omitted).  
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ties, federally secured programs and in employment.”98  The Court 
cited to legislative history making “it quite clear that the fundamental 
object of Title II was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity 
that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establish-
ments.’”99  “At the same time, however,” the Court continued, Con-
gress concluded it could achieve this objective “‘by congressional ac-
tion based on the commerce power of the Constitution.’”100  I shall 
return to this language about dignity in explicating how Heart of Atlan-
ta Motel features in more recent public accommodations cases.  Most 
pertinent to Title II, however, is that some members of the Court and 
of Congress thought that a prudential approach rooted in the com-
merce power fundamentally obscured the significant equality and citi-
zenship issues at stake.101
4.   Ending Discrimination Through Peaceful and Voluntary 
Settlement: Demonstrations and Demanding Service as the 
Backdrop of Title II 
 
Worthy of comment in the above history is the Court’s reference 
to “peaceful and voluntary settlement.”102  However, the Court simply 
echoed the stated purpose in the Senate Report on the law, but gave 
no feeling for lawmakers’ sense of urgency with respect to finding that 
settlement.103
Contemporaneous writings situate Title II in the context of nu-
merous, repeated, peaceful efforts by African-American citizens—
often side-by-side with white civil rights advocates—to integrate lunch 
counters, soda fountains, restaurants, and hotels, and, in effect de-
mand service on equal terms.  For example, an essay about the sit-in 
movement by civil rights attorney Marion A. Wright observed that 
“[t]he Freedom Rides shared a common parentage with the sit-ins—
they both spring from a firm resolve to exercise full rights as Ameri-
can citizens” and “are both characterized by nonviolence.”
   
104
 
 98. Id. at 246. 
  The 
 99. Id. at 250 (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 16). 
 100. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 17). 
 101. See discussion infra Parts II & III. 
 102. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 246. 
 103. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 1 (“The purpose of S. 1732 is to achieve a 
peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent problem of racial and religious dis-
crimination or segregation by establishments doing business with the general public, and 
by labor unions and professional, business, and trade associations.”). 
 104. Marion A. Wright, Public Accommodations: The Sit-in Movement: Progress Report and 
Prognosis, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 89, 89 (Donald B. King & 
Charles W. Quick eds., 1965). 
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Freedom Riders were successful “primarily due to the interstate na-
ture of most travel, and state involvement with intrastate travel, ren-
dering action by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the fed-
eral courts readily obtainable and effective.”105  By contrast, sit-ins, 
“dealing with public accommodations in a variety of circumstances, 
and . . . jurisdictions,” experienced more “vicissitudes of fortune.”106  
He reported that the sit-ins began in 1960 when “four black students 
at North Carolina A. & T. College in Greensboro” attempted to get 
coffee at the dime store, and when “[t]he manager said he could not 
serve them because of local custom, … they just sat and waited.”107  
Soon after, other students at their own school and later from some 
other colleges joined them for future visits.108  Heckling by white tee-
nagers ensued, and “white boys waved Confederate flags, chanted, 
and cursed.”109  After management received a bomb threat, “the po-
lice emptied the store,” and the store reopened, but with its lunch 
counters closed.110  Wright added that the sit-in movement “spread 
electrically throughout the entire South.  Negro and white demon-
strators, principally college students, aided by a sprinkling of profes-
sors, ministers, social workers, and others, peacably invaded and pick-
eted lunch counters, picture shows, parks, beaches, and other 
segregated places of entertainment, amusement, and public accom-
modation.”111
This movement “wrought a transformation of southern customs,” 
with “capitulation,” in the majority of cases, coming “peacefully, al-
most gracefully,” as “many inn-keepers welcomed the pressure which 
enabled them to act.”
  
112  But alongside such change was resistance, of-
ten taking the form of invoking (sometimes newly-passed) state tres-
pass or criminal mischief laws to convict demonstrators, which led to a 
“spate of cases . . . work[ing] their way to courts of last resort.”113
 
 105. Id.    
  
 106. Id.       
 107. Id. at 90 (quoting Daniel H. Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Prob-
lems of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315, 317). 
 108. Pollitt, supra note 107, at 317–18. 
 109. Id. at 318.          
 110. Id.          
 111. Wright, supra note 104, at 90–91. 
 112. Id. at 91.    
 113. Id.; see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidi-
scrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 488 (2000) (“Only after 
the federal courts were clogged with thousands of such cases did the Kennedy Justice De-
partment and a bipartisan congressional coalition decide to draft federal legislation out-
lawing racial discrimination by business establishments and employers.”). 
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While there were “many exceptions,” innkeepers generally prevailed 
in southern state courts, and demonstrators, in federal courts.114
The prevalence of such trespass suits and the imperative that 
Title II secure a peaceful settlement of a national problem are evident 
in the fact that, the same day in which the Court announced its Heart 
of Atlanta Motel and McClung rulings, it also announced Hamm v. City 
of Rock Hill.
   
115  In Hamm, the Court ruled that the passage of Title II 
abated convictions secured prior to its passage based on state trespass 
charges applied to Negroes for participating in “sit-in” demonstra-
tions in luncheon facilities of retail stores in South Carolina and Ar-
kansas.116  In reasoning that, just as “the Act would abate all federal 
prosecutions,” it should also, “by virtue of the Supremacy Clause,” ab-
ate pending state convictions, the Court stated: “The great purpose of 
the civil rights legislation was to obliterate the effect of a distressing 
chapter of our history.”117
Congress, as well as the two Presidents who recommended 
the legislation, clearly intended to eradicate an unhappy 
chapter in our history.  The peaceful conduct for which peti-
tioners were prosecuted was on behalf of a principle since 
embodied in the law of the land.  The convictions were 
based on the theory that the rights of a property owner had 
been violated.  However, the supposed right to discriminate 
on the basis of race, at least in covered establishments, was 
nullified by the statute.
  The Court elaborated: 
118
In contrast to Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach, which were 9-
to-0 decisions, Hamm was a 5-to-4 decision.  Title II’s concern for 
peaceful settlement also animated the dissents, although the dissen-
ters reached different conclusions about the retroactive import of 
Title II for civil disobedience.  Justice Black, for example, disclaimed 
any interpretation of Title II that would permit persons “refused ser-
vice a ‘right’ to take the law into their own hands by sitting down and 
occupying the premises for as long as they choose to stay.”
 
119
 
 114. Wright, supra note 
  To the 
contrary, “one of the chief purposes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was 
to take such disputes out of the streets and restaurants and into the 
courts, which Congress has granted the power to provide an adequate 
104, at 91. 
 115. 379 U.S. 306 (1964). 
 116. Id. at 307, 317.       
 117. Id. at 315. 
 118. Id. at 315–16. 
 119. Id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting).      
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and orderly judicial remedy.”120
[I]n what is perhaps the most extensive and careful legisla-
tive history ever compiled, dealing with one of the most tho-
roughly discussed and debated bills ever passed by Congress, 
a history including millions and millions of words written on 
tens of thousands of pages contained in volumes weighing 
well over half a hundred pounds, in which every conceivable 
aspect and application of the 1964 Act were discussed ad in-
finitum, not even once did a single sponsor, proponent or 
opponent of the Act intimate a hope or express a fear that 
the Act was intended to have the effect which the Court 
gives it today.
  Here, the same extensive and tho-
rough legislative history that led Justice Black to decline to stay the 
lower court’s injunction in Heart of Atlanta Motel led him to reject an 
interpretation of Title II in the face of legislative silence: 
121
Justice White echoed Justice Black on the silence in the legisla-
tive record, contending that such silence should lead to a conclusion 
opposite that reached by the majority.  The disruptive effects of civil 
disobedience also counseled this interpretation: “[H]ad Congress in-
tended to ratify massive disobedience to the law, so often attended by 
violence, I feel sure it would have said so in unmistakable lan-
guage . . . .”
  
122
Although Heart of Atlanta Motel stressed discrimination’s burden 
on interstate commerce in terms of its impact upon African-
Americans’ freedom to travel, lawmakers and contemporaneous 
commentators on Title II also stress the downward economic impact 
of “racial strife”—segregation and demonstrations challenging it.
 
123
 
 120. Id. at 318–19. 
  
These twin burdens are evident in Solicitor General Archibald Cox’s 
oral argument before the Court.  He argued that Congress made a 
record that segregation “was creating a grave national problem,” giv-
ing statistics both about the burdens on travel suffered by Negroes 
and about the number of demonstrations in 174 cities, thirty-two 
states, and the District of Columbia, “[a]bout a third of [which] were 
 121. Id. at 321–22 (White, J., dissenting). Also dissenting, Justice Harlan stated: “I en-
tirely agree with my Brother BLACK’S poignant observations on this score; there is not a 
scintilla of evidence which remotely suggests that Congress had any such revolutionary 
course in mind.”  Id. at 324 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 328 (White, J., dissenting). 
 123. Quick, supra note 23, at 664–65 (referring to “racial strife”); Additional Views on 
H.R. 7152 of Hon. William M. McCulloch et al., H. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 9–13 (1963) 
(detailing as burdens on commerce the dampening of travel and the economic toll of 
demonstrations and segregation). 
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concerned solely with discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion.”124  Cox went on to speak of the “tremendous” effect of these 
“demonstrations, picketing, boycotts, other forms of protest, upon 
business conditions,” and therefore, “upon interstate commerce.”125
With this background in mind, let us return to the Court’s state-
ment that the Civil Rights Act undertook “to prevent through peace-
ful and voluntary settlement discrimination . . . in places of public ac-
commodation and public facilities.”
  
126
Happily, the civil disobedience and the beatings related to 
public accommodations are well-nigh over. Now the cause 
seekers can move on to more fertile areas such as voting 
rights, employment and housing.  Equally appreciated will 
be the demise of the “rednecked” bully more than anxious 
to take advantage of peaceful protest.  Perhaps a measure of 
the violence can be relegated to the limbo of forgotten his-
tory.
  For example, one 
contemporaneous commentator on Title II predicted (too optimisti-
cally) its impact:  
127
I say “too optimistically” because peaceful attempts by African-
Americans to exercise the new rights secured by the Civil Rights Act 
and to move on, as the author suggests, to voting rights, brought new 
clashes and sometimes violence.  News stories reporting on Moreton 
Rolleston’s lawsuit also report, for example, on arrests of Negroes for 
seeking service at restaurants, jailing of Negroes and whites for 
launching a voter registration campaign, violent altercations at movie 
theaters, whites firing shots into a hall of Negroes holding a voter reg-
istration rally, and a series of fires at Negro churches in Mississippi.
  
128
In denying Heart of Atlanta’s request for a stay, Justice Black ob-
served the thorough national debate over the Civil Rights Act.  Legal 
commentators at the time referred to Title II as passing “only after a 
fiery congressional debate,”
   
129 and as “produc[ing] the greatest 
amount of controversy because of its intensely personal character.”130
 
 124. Excerpts from Rights Case Argument, supra note 
  
64, at 24. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 246 (1964). 
 127. Quick, supra note 23, at 709. 
 128. As FBI Chief Left, Delta Church Burned, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 1964, at 36; Hotelier 
Brings $11 Million Rights Action, supra note 29, at 7; New Clashes Mark Tests of Rights Law, 
CHI. TRIB., July 7, 1964, at 7. 
 129. Melville B. Nimmer, A Proposal for Judicial Validation of a Previously Unconstitutional 
Law: The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1394, 1394 (1965).  
 130. Quick, supra note 23, at 661; see also Nimmer, supra note 129, at 1394 (calling Title 
II “[b]y far the most controversial aspect” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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By the time Congress enacted Title II, the prevalence of discrimina-
tion in public accommodations had become a national and interna-
tional embarrassment.131  As one legal commentator observed: “The 
myriad consequences to the United States nationally and internation-
ally of dual racial standards under a single political ideal are the true 
focus of national legislative concern.”132  Title II, thus, was soon “re-
garded in many quarters as a token of the nation’s sincerity in moving 
to resolve the ‘American dilemma.’”133
On this point of sincerity and resolution, it is important not to 
treat the resistance of Rolleston, Maddox, and Ollie’s Barbeque to the 
law as emblematic of southern reaction.  For example, side-by-side in 
the Atlanta Constitution’s news stories about those legal challenges 
were headlines such as “U.S. Responding Well To Rights Law, Says a 
Pleased President,”
 
134 “Comply in Peace, Both Races Urge,”135 
“Pleased by Rights Compliance, NAACP Opposes New Protests,”136 
“[Commerce Secretary] Hodges Hails State for Accepting Law,”137 
and “Many Doors Open Quietly to Negroes.”138  On July 3, the Atlanta 
Constitution published an editorial, “May Our Children Look Back 
Proudly on Our Response to Lawful Duty,” in which the paper called 
for replacing “the tumult and the shouting” with “trust and progress,” 
and for change “without defiance or rancor.”139  It observed: “A Con-
gress answerable to the American people has overwhelmingly passed 
this law after the longest and most careful scrutiny and debate.  A 
Southern President understanding of the region’s difficulties now be-
comes the law’s executor and he asks us to comply.”140
 
 131. Quick, supra note 
  
23, at 662. 
 132. Ira Michael Heyman, Civil Rights 1964 Term: Responses to Direct Action, 1965 SUP. CT. 
REV. 159, 163. 
 133. Nimmer, supra note 129, at 1394. 
 134. Bill Shipp, U.S. Responding Well to Rights Law, Says a Pleased President, ATLANTA 
CONST., July 4, 1964, at 1. 
 135. Ted Simmons, Comply in Peace, Both Races Urge, ATLANTA CONST., July 3, 1964, at 1. 
 136. Bill Shipp, Pleased by Rights Compliance, NAACP Opposes New Protests, ATLANTA 
CONST., July 11, 1964, at 3. 
 137. Sam Hopkins, Hodges Hails State for Accepting Law, ATLANTA CONST., July 9, 1964, at 
1. 
 138. Associated Press, Many Doors Open Quietly to Negroes, ATLANTA CONST., July 4, 1964, 
at 2 . 
 139. May Our Children Look Back Proudly on Our Response to Lawful Duty, ATLANTA CONST., 
July 3, 1964, at 4. 
 140. Id. 
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5.  The Commerce Power, Mobility, and Quantitative and Qualitative 
Harms  
In reasoning that Title II is a proper exercise of Congress’s power 
to regulate interstate commerce, the Court hearkened back to the 
expansive account of the commerce power elaborated in Gibbons v. 
Ogden,141 where Chief Justice John Marshall stated that the power was 
as broad as commerce itself, which included “every species of com-
mercial intercourse.”142  The “test” for the proper exercise of power 
by Congress is whether the activity to be regulated as commerce “con-
cerns more States than one” and “has a real and substantial relation to 
the national interest.”143
In concluding that the Act was within Congress’s commerce 
power, the Court also stressed the relevance of the changed economic 
and social conditions in contemporary society: “the fact that certain 
kinds of businesses may not in 1875 have been sufficiently involved in 
interstate commerce to warrant bringing them within the ambit of the 
commerce power is not necessarily dispositive of the same question 
today.”
 
144
Our populace had not reached its present mobility, nor were 
facilities, goods and services circulating as readily in inter-
state commerce as they are today. . . .  The sheer increase in 
volume of interstate traffic alone would give discriminatory 
practices which inhibit travel a far larger impact upon the 
Nation’s commerce than such practices had on the economy 
of another day.
  In 1875, when Congress passed the earlier Act, the Court 
observed: 
145
This attention to the changing nature of the economy comes up later 
in cases like Roberts v. United States Jaycees, in explaining the rationale 
behind a broad definition of public accommodation.
 
146
The changing nature of the economy in a more mobile society 
also featured in explaining the burden posed by race-based discrimi-
nation in access to accommodations.  The record included testimony 
pertaining to: 
 
 
 141. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).  
 142. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 254–55 (1964) (quoting 
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193–94) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143. Id. at 255 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144. Id. at 251. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See infra Part IV. 
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the fact that our people have become increasingly mo-
bile . . .; that Negroes in particular have been the subject of 
discrimination in transient accommodation, having to travel 
great distances to secure the same; that often they have been 
unable to obtain accommodations and have had to call upon 
friends to put them up overnight . . . and that these condi-
tions had become so acute as to require the listing of availa-
ble lodging for Negroes in a special guidebook which was it-
self “dramatic testimony to the difficulties” Negroes encoun-
encounter in travel.147
This testimony in Heart of Atlanta Motel provided a compelling 
example of a serious burden on travel.  Moreover, the practices were 
“nationwide.”  Here the Court summarized testimony by the Under 
Secretary of Commerce about the “qualitative” and “quantitative” im-
pact on Negroes’ ability to travel interstate: 
 
The former [“qualitative”] was the obvious impairment of the 
Negro traveler’s pleasure and convenience that resulted 
when he continually was uncertain of finding lodging.  As 
for the latter [“quantitative”], there was evidence that this 
uncertainty stemming from racial discrimination had the ef-
fect of discouraging travel on the part of a substantial por-
tion of the Negro community.148
This issue of the magnitude of the burdens that discrimination 
imposes is relevant to current discussions about whether there should 
be a “moral marketplace” such that government should not compel 
businesses to serve customers to whom they object on moral grounds 
(for example, a photographer who does not wish to photograph a civ-
il union ceremony or same-sex wedding).
 
149  Douglas Laycock makes a 
comparative harm argument: “requiring a merchant to perform ser-
vices that violate his deeply held moral commitments is far more se-
rious, different in kind and not just in degree” than the “mere incon-
venience” to a same-sex couple of “having to get the same service 
from another provider nearby.”150
 
 147. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252–53 (citations omitted). 
  However, if so many merchants in 
a particular community refused service to same-sex couples that such 
couples would face a “significant hardship,” then “the merchant’s 
right to moral integrity is outweighed by the same-sex couples’ right 
 148. Id. at 253. 
 149. See, e.g., ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING 
THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE  2–3, 303–05 (2010). 
 150. Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: 
EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 189–98 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
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to live in the community in accordance with their moral commit-
ments.”151
So, too, Congress’s identification of a “nationwide” problem is re-
levant to subsequent debates within the Court over whether a prob-
lem that Congress addressed was “truly national” or “purely local.”
   
152
6.  Congress May Legislate Against Moral Wrongs 
 
Another significant feature of the Court’s opinion in Heart of At-
lanta Motel with continuing relevance is its statement that legislating 
against moral wrongs is a proper governmental end pursued through 
antidiscrimination laws.  In other words, race discrimination is a mor-
al wrong and Congress may reach it through the commerce power.153  
The relationship between commercial and moral wrongs arose in oral 
argument.  When the Solicitor General stated that Title II was “ad-
dressed to a commercial problem of grave national significance,” Jus-
tice Goldberg pressed him: “Only commercial, Mr. Solicitor General?  
Isn’t there [a] moral problem, also?”154
 Nor should we forget, Mr. Justice Goldberg, that Congress 
in addressing itself to that commercial problem was also 
keeping faith with the problems [sic] declared by the Conti-
nental Congress that all men are created equal.   
  In response, Cox said he 
wished to and would “emphasize repeatedly in [his] argument that 
Title II is addressed to a grave commercial problem.”  However, he 
also invoked the Nation’s conscience: 
 The failure to keep that promise lay heavy on the con-
science of the entire nation, North as well as South, East as 
well as West.155
When pressed by Justice Harlan on the statement in the United 
States’s brief that “we state our case on the commerce clause,” Cox re-
turned to the idea of a commercial problem.  He stated that the 
record of the impact on commerce was made, and “that the impact of 
these disturbances arising out of racial discrimination was not merely 
 
 
 151. Id. at 199 (discussing with approval Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Les-
sons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 150, at 77, 93–102). 
 152. See infra text accompanying notes 316–341. 
 153. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 256–57 (explaining that the fact that Congress 
has exercised its commerce power to regulate moral wrongs such as gambling, misbrand-
ing of drugs, and racial discrimination, and the fact that Congress was also legislating 
against moral wrongs does not make such use of its commerce power any less valid).  
 154. Excerpts from Rights Cases Argument, supra note 64. 
 155. Id.  Mr. Cox probably intended to use the term “promise” and instead used the 
term “problems.” 
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social and moral.  Nobody denies that aspect of it.  But that it was na-
tional and commercial.”156
In its opinion, the Court observed that Congress has often regu-
lated commerce to reach activities that are “moral wrongs,” such as the 
white-slave traffic, deceptive trade practices, and criminal enterpris-
es.
 
157
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many 
of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. . . .  But 
that fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence 
of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on 
commercial intercourse. . . .  Congress was not restricted by 
the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate com-
merce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral 
and social wrong.
  The Court stated: 
158
Some Justices—like some lawmakers—believed, nonetheless, that 
this focus on “obstructions” of commerce obscured the problem of 
obstruction of equal citizenship.
 
159
7.  Property and Liberty Rights to Discriminate? Lessons from State 
Laws 
 
Another notable feature of the Court’s opinion is its deployment 
of the relationship between state and federal public accommodations 
law in disposing of the motel owner’s claim that the Civil Rights Act 
deprived him of liberty and property under the Fifth Amendment.160  
The Court rejected the appellant’s claim briskly.  It applied a rational 
basis test, saying that if “Congress had a rational basis for finding that 
racial discrimination by motels affected commerce,” and if it used rea-
sonable and appropriate means to eliminate that evil, then “appellant 
has no ‘right’ to select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental 
regulation.”161  In observing that public accommodations laws are not 
“novel,” the Court noted that thirty-two states “now have it on their 
books either by statute or executive order,” as do many cities.  Some 
laws “go back fourscore years.”162
 
 156. Id. 
  Indeed, the Court read the Civil 
 157. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 256–57.  
 158. Id. at 257. 
 159. See infra Part II.D (discussing Justice Douglas’s concurrence); infra Part II.E (dis-
cussing Justice Goldberg’s concurrence); see also infra Part III (discussing the competing 
appeals to the Thirteenth Amendment in congressional consideration of Title II). 
 160. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258–61. 
 161. Id. at 258–59. 
 162. Id. at 259. 
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Rights Cases as “[p]erhaps the first such holding” that these state laws 
“do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment”: Justice Bradley “inferentially found that innkeepers, ‘by the 
laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent 
of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjec-
tionable persons who in good faith apply for them.’”163  The state laws 
have survived constitutional challenge, and, “in some cases the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clause objections have been specifically 
discarded in this Court.”164  The Court concluded: “As a result the 
constitutionality of such state statutes stands unquestioned.”165
Pertinent here is how states enacted public accommodations laws 
even in the absence of active federal lawmaking in the area.  Prior to 
the 1875 Act, only three states had statutes barring racial discrimina-
tion in public accommodations, but after the Civil Rights Cases, “states 
took the initiative,” with eighteen states having such laws by 1900,
  
166 
and thirty-two by the time the Court heard the motel’s challenge.167  
However, strict judicial construction of these laws, often in the face of 
assertions that enforcement would infringe common law property 
rights, blunted their force, and some laws had fallen into disuse.168  
Further, when Title II was passed, no southern states had statutes bar-
ring racial discrimination in public accommodations and some state 
and local laws still compelled segregation.169
 
 163. Id. at 259–60 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)).  
  As I discuss in Part IV, in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court reiterates the role of state in-
itiative protecting against discrimination in public accommodations in 
the absence of federal law.  
 164. Id. at 260 (citing Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 34 n.12 (1948)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Robert R. Bebermeyer, Public Accommodations and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 19 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 456, 464 (1965).  
 167. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260.  
 168. Bebermeyer, supra note 166, at 265 (observing that “[i]n spite of the constitutional-
ity of the state public accommodations statutes, many of the acts have fallen into disuse 
and strict construction by the state courts has severely limited their effectiveness” (footnote 
omitted)).  For a thorough analysis of the history of these state laws and the changing in-
terpretation of the common law obligations of innkeepers with the advent of Jim Crow 
laws, see Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996). 
 169. See Bebermeyer, supra note 166, at 464 n.66 (listing all state antidiscrimination laws 
in place when Congress passed Title II, none of which is a southern state law).  For a dis-
cussion of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s testimony on the effects of state and local 
laws that required segregation, see infra Part III.A. 
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8.  The Harms and Benefits of Antidiscrimination Laws 
Although Rolleston alleged $11 million in damages (in the event 
his motel had to comply with the law), contending desegregation 
would ruin his business, reputation, and goodwill, the Court found it 
“doubtful if in the long run appellant will suffer economic loss as a re-
sult of the Act.  Experience is to the contrary where discrimination is 
completely obliterated as to all public accommodations.”170  The 
Court’s reference to experience to the contrary echoes contempora-
neous commentaries on Title II making the economic argument that 
ending segregation will help local economies by increasing the flow of 
tourist dollars into cities.171
But whether [appellant will suffer economic loss in the long 
run] is of no consequence since this Court has specifically 
held that the fact that a “member of the class which is regu-
lated may suffer economic losses not shared by others . . . 
has never been a barrier” to such legislation. . . .  Likewise in 
a long line of cases this Court has rejected the claim that the 
prohibition of racial discrimination in public accommoda-
tions interferes with personal liberty.
  But the Court also explained that if there 
was some harm as a result of the application of the Civil Rights Act, it 
was irrelevant to the Act’s constitutionality:  
172
These twin arguments that antidiscrimination laws do not harm 
those subject to them and that, in any case, harm is constitutionally 
permissible recur in newer generations of public accommodations 
controversies, although the asserted injuries are not to property but to 
associational and religious freedom.
 
173
C.  Justice Black’s Concurrence: Don’t Leave Out the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments 
 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Black reiterated that there was 
an “ample basis” for Congress’s conclusions about the impact of dis-
 
 170. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260. 
 171. Quick, supra note 23, at 664 (stating that “the Dallas Chamber of Commerce re-
ported in 1963 that integration in that city has added eight to ten million dollars in con-
vention business,” and that “[a]fter Atlanta, Georgia, hotels announced an open door pol-
icy with respect to race, three conventions promising 3,000 delegates committed their 
respective organizations to meet in that city”). 
 172. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260–61 (alterations in both) (quoting Bowles v. 
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944)). The Court summarily rejected the appellant’s 
claim that the Civil Rights Act “is a taking of property without just compensation.”  Id. at 
261. 
 173. See infra Part IV. 
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crimination in interstate commerce.174  Like the majority, he invoked 
Chief Justice Marshall’s expansive interpretation of “commerce,” al-
though he turns not to Gibbons but to the “standard” set forth in 
M’Culloch v. Maryland: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”175  He 
also stressed that upholding the law does not “uproot and throw into 
the discard” the distinction between “purely local” activity and that 
which affects the “national interest,” given the aggregate effects of 
many local events of discrimination.176
In contrast to the majority, he expressly invoked the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments as additional sources of Congress’s legi-
timate power:  
 
In view of the Commerce Clause it is not possible to deny 
that the aim of protecting interstate commerce from undue 
burdens is a legitimate end.  In view of the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, it is not possible to deny 
that the aim of protecting Negroes from discrimination is al-
so a legitimate end.177
He also found the means adopted appropriate and consistent with 
“both [the] letter and spirit” of the Constitution.
  
178  As to the motel’s 
assertion that Title II violates the Thirteenth Amendment, Justice 
Black merely stated in a footnote that such an argument “is so insubs-
tantial that it requires no further discussion.”179
D.  Justice Douglas’s Concurrence: How to Resolve the Evident Clash of 
Rights  
 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas extensively discussed 
the flaws in the appellant’s assertion of property rights as a basis to 
defeat Title II.  His analysis is instructive for contemporary clashes of 
 
 174. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J., concurring). 
 175. Id. at 276 (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176. Id. at 275. 
 177. Id. at 276. 
 178. Recall that in refusing to stay the lower court’s order, Justice Black referred to his 
belief that Congress had “broad grants of power” in both the Commerce Clause and the 
Fourteenth Amendment sufficient to “control commerce among the states and to enforce 
the 14th amendment’s policy against racial discrimination.”  Black Upholds Rights Law, supra 
note 44.  
 179. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 278 n.12. 
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rights, for example, when rights to freedom of association and reli-
gion are in evident tension with rights to free and equal citizenship.180  
His concurrence is also notable for his “reluctance” to allow the 
Court’s decision “to rest solely on the Commerce Clause,” rather than 
on the legislative power contained in Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.181
My reluctance is . . . due to . . . my belief that the right of 
people to be free of state action that discriminates against 
them because of race, like the “right of persons to move 
freely from State to State,” . . . “occupies a more protected 
position in our constitutional system than does the move-
ment of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.”
  He stressed the human rights dimension of the case: 
182
Justice Douglas also contended that “[a] decision based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment would have a more settling effect,” avoiding 
the need for “litigation over whether a particular restaurant or inn is 
within the commerce definitions of the Act or whether a particular 
customer is an interstate traveler.”  Justice Douglas would have con-
strued the Act to “apply to all customers in all the enumerated places 
of public accommodation,” a construction that “would put an end to 
all obstructionist strategies and finally close one door on a bitter 
chapter in American history.”
 
183  Commentary by legal scholars at the 
time of the decision found unpersuasive Justice Douglas’s claim that a 
Fourteenth Amendment holding would “have a more settling effect,” 
detailing the likely extensive judicial involvement and rulemaking 
such a holding would necessitate.184
 
 180. See infra Part IV.  
  
 181. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 279–80 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 182. Id. at 279 (Douglas, J. concurring) (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 
177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring)). 
 183. Id. at 280.  Justice Douglas reiterated that a decision based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment would “put[] an end to all obstructionist strategies and allowing every per-
son—whatever his race, creed, or color—to patronize all places of public accommodation 
without discrimination whether he travels interstate or intrastate.”  Id. at 286. 
 184. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 129–31 
(1965) (arguing that “[a] holding based on the fourteenth amendment would pose ques-
tions as to the scope of the newly declared right,” such as which enterprises were included 
and on what judicial criterion, and would require generating “a new set of constitutional 
standards governing private conduct covered by the amendment”); Heyman, supra note 
132, at 163–64 (finding Justice Douglas’s opinion “more satisfactory” than the majority’s in 
being “verbally more direct,” but concluding that the Court, in upholding the Act based 
on Congress’s commerce power, “wisely” avoided the Fourteenth Amendment issue and 
“gratuitously fashion[ed] the detailed rules that are needed to distinguish public from pri-
vate accommodations”); Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Book Review, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 234, 236 
(1966) (reviewing MILTON R. KONVITZ, EXPANDING LIBERTIES—FREEDOM’S GAINS IN 
POSTWAR AMERICA (1966)) (noting that “Konvitz berates the Court” for upholding the Civ-
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For Justice Douglas, the relevant obstruction was not to com-
merce but to African-Americans’ full realization of the rights of citi-
zenship.  He appreciated the strategic point that, in 1964, Congress 
relied on its commerce power to avoid “what was thought to be the 
obstacle of the Civil Rights Cases.”185  But Justice Douglas emphasized 
that the record made it “clear that the objectives of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were by no means ignored.”186  He illustrated with ex-
cerpts from the Senate Report about the clash of rights, or perhaps 
better, the improper assertion of rights claims to defeat public ac-
commodations legislation.187
One pertinent theme in the Senate Report is its articulation of 
the purposes of private property as an institution and how to address 
the clash of rights and values when one asserts property rights (as 
means to liberty and freedom) to defeat the freedom and liberty of 
others.  Just as the Report notes the function of private property as a 
buffer against state power (and being at the mercy of others), ac-
counts of freedom of association stress a similar buffering function 
(for example, as articulated in Roberts).
  Some of the reasoning in that Report—
and his use of it—is instructive with respect to more contemporary ob-
jections to public accommodations laws. 
188
Does the owner of private property devoted to use as a pub-
lic establishment enjoy a property right to refuse to deal with 
any member of the public because of that member’s race, re-
ligion, or national origin? . . .  [T]he English common law 
answered this question in the negative.  It reasoned that one 
who employed his private property for purposes of commercial gain by 
offering goods or services to the public must stick to his bargain.  It 
is to be remembered that the right of the private property 
  But, as this passage from 
the Report makes clear, this liberty-enhancing function of property 
does not translate into an absolute right that hinders the liberty of 
others: 
 
il Rights Act under the Commerce Clause, rather than the “fourteenth amendment route, 
suggested by Justices Douglas and Goldberg,” but argues there is “little to support Doug-
las’s assertion that” such a ruling would have a “more settling effect” and instead that there 
is a “strong probability” it “might have opened the act to recurring litigation in the man-
ner of desegregation itself in the years when the Court was compelled to depend entirely 
on its own inventiveness and resources”). 
 185. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 284 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 284–86 (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22–23).  
 188. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–619 (1984) (“[W]e have noted 
that certain kinds of personal bonds . . . foster diversity and act as critical buffers between 
the individual and the power of the State.” (citations omitted)). 
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owner to serve or sell to whom he pleased was never claimed 
when laws were enacted prohibiting the private property 
owner from dealing with persons of a particular race.  Nor 
were such laws ever struck down as an infringement upon 
this supposed right of the property owner. 
But there are stronger and more persuasive reasons for 
not allowing concepts of private property to defeat public 
accommodations law.  The institution of private property ex-
ists for the purpose of enhancing the individual freedom and 
liberty of human beings.  This institution assures that the in-
dividual need not be at the mercy of others, including gov-
ernment, in order to earn a livelihood and prosper from his 
individual efforts.  Private property provides the individual 
with something of value that will serve him well in obtaining 
what he desires or requires in his daily life.  
Is this time honored means to freedom and liberty now 
to be twisted so as to defeat individual freedom and liberty? 
189
The Report (quoted by Justice Douglas) explained that restric-
tions on private property (including the abolition of slavery) ensure 
that it serves its liberty-enhancing end: 
  
Certainly denial of a right to discriminate or segregate by 
race or religion would not weaken the attributes of private 
property that make it an effective means of obtaining indi-
vidual freedom.  In fact, in order to assure that the institu-
tion of private property serves the end of individual freedom 
and liberty it has been restricted in many instances.  The 
most striking example of this is the abolition of slavery.  
Slaves were treated as items of private property, yet surely no 
man dedicated to the cause of individual freedom could 
contend that individual freedom and liberty suffered by 
emancipation of the slaves.190
In these passages from the Senate Report, readers can find im-
portant precursors or parallels to more contemporary arguments 
about how antidiscrimination laws advance freedom and American 
 
 
 189. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 284–86 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22–23) (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. at 285 (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22–23) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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ideals.  There is also a parallel to arguments about the “bargain” one 
makes in entering the realm of business or dealing with the public.191
The Senate Report goes on to observe that zoning laws put great-
er restrictions upon private property rights than do public accommo-
dations laws.  Zoning laws are necessary, and their restrictions do not 
lessen the freedom-enhancing aspects of property.  To the contrary, 
“[s]uch laws and regulations restricting private property are necessary 
so that human beings may develop their communities in a reasonable 
and peaceful manner.  Surely the presence of such restrictions does 
not detract from the role of private property in securing individual li-
berty and freedom.”
 
192
These claims, or predictions, about legal restrictions on property 
are precursors to arguments in a newer generation of antidiscrimina-
tion cases that the basic goods protected by freedom of association 
are not injured—or not injured to a constitutionally troubling de-
gree—by public accommodations laws requiring nondiscrimination in 
membership or services.
 
193
The Senate Report is reminiscent of political liberalism’s concept 
of the mutual adjustment of equal basic liberties.
  Here, the argument is that private proper-
ty can still secure liberty and freedom for the right-holder, even if 
there are limits on the right. 
194  Thus, if eliminat-
ing racial discrimination is a prerequisite for everyone having free-
dom, then government legitimately bars such discrimination.  Rather 
than accepting the criticism that antidiscrimination laws pursue the 
equal citizenship of some at the expense of the liberty or freedom of 
others, the Report envisions the necessary adjustment of freedoms 
and liberties so all can have them.195  Title II expresses the entitle-
ment of “all persons” to “full and equal enjoyment” of public accom-
modations.196
 
 191. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633–635 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (drawing distinction be-
tween mostly “expressive” and mostly “commercial associations” and arguing: “An associa-
tion must choose its market.  Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substan-
tial degree it loses the complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy 
if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.”).  
 In the following passage, the Report is evocative of lib-
 192. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 286 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22–23). 
 193. See infra Part III. 
 194. For an overview of this concept, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 295–99 
(1993).   
 195. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 288 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22–23).  
 196. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(a), 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2006)). 
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eral theorist John Rawls’s notion of adjusting basic liberties to secure 
the full value of free and equal citizenship:197
Nor can it be reasonably argued that racial or religious dis-
crimination is a vital factor in the ability of private property 
to constitute an effective vehicle for assuring personal free-
dom. . . .  The Pledge of this Nation is to secure freedom for 
every individual; that pledge will be furthered by elimination 
of such practices.
 
198
The above quote speaks, in effect, about appropriate limitations 
on how we conceive of rights, such as the scope of the constitutionally 
protected right to property.  Property rights may be subject to limita-
tions if they impinge on the rights of others, such as the right to be 
free from discrimination in access to the goods and services offered by 
businesses.  As property scholar Joseph Singer argues, this is an ap-
propriate legal baseline about property rights in a free and democrat-
ic society.
 
199
E.  Justice Goldberg’s Concurrence: “The Vindication of Human Dignity 
and Not Mere Economics” 
  Of course, as I mention below, critics of Title II emphati-
cally rejected this notion of appropriate limitations on property 
rights.  As I mention in Part III, a salient question in subsequent gen-
erations of public accommodations cases is how to define the scope of 
freedom of expressive association. 
Dignity is the basic theme of Justice Goldberg’s concurrence.  
Congress, he agreed, had power under the Commerce Clause to enact 
the law, but dignity was the law’s primary purpose: “ The primary pur-
pose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . is the vindication of human 
dignity and not mere economics.”200
The primary purpose of . . . [the Civil Rights Act], then, is to 
solve this problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that 
surely accompanies denials of equal access to public estab-
lishments.  Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, 
  In support, Justice Goldberg 
quoted the Senate Commerce Committee: 
 
 197. RAWLS, supra note 194, at 295–99, 358–59. 
 198. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22 (quoted by Justice Douglas at 379 U.S. at 
373).  
 199. See Joseph William Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle in American Property Law, 1 
ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 83, 84 (2011) [hereinafter Singer, The Anti-
Apartheid Principle] (“United States law does and should recognize a foundational anti-
apartheid principle that puts out of bounds market conduct that deprives individuals of 
equal opportunities because of their race.”). 
 200. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 291 (Goldberg, J., concurring).  
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hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, 
and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is 
told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public be-
cause of his race or color.  It is equally the inability to ex-
plain to a child that regardless of education, civility, courte-
sy, and morality he will be denied the right to enjoy equal 
treatment, even though he be a citizen of the United States 
and may well be called upon to lay down his life to assure 
this Nation continues.201
This emphasis by Congress on dignity resonates with language in 
later public accommodations cases (such as Roberts’ cite to the majori-
ty’s reference to “dignity” as the primary legislative objective).  Con-
temporaneous commentators applauded Justice Goldberg’s focus 
upon dignity.
 
202  One review of the Court’s civil rights decisions for 
the term praised Goldberg’s themes as “more satisfactory than the 
majority’s in that they are verbally more direct” in getting at what is 
not “mainly a problem of economics”: “The indignity, humiliation, 
and frustration of Negroes resulting from such discrimination are 
closer to the mark” than the fact that they may be discouraged from 
taking trips.203
The Report’s striking use of the term “public,” in the passage 
quoted by Justice Goldberg, also defies a simple public/private divi-
sion.  The Report refers to being told a person is “unacceptable as a 
member of the public.”
 
204  The public realm, in this account, includes 
spaces in civil society where people interact, go to the movies, or pur-
chase food.  The public/private line is blurred in the sense that the 
“public” space is not equated with being a governmental space.205  It is 
public in the sense that an event is “open to the public” or “members 
of the public” are invited to attend.206
 
 201. Id. at 291–92 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (alterations in both) (quoting S. REP. NO. 
88-872, supra note 
 
4, at 16). 
 202. In a 1965 profile of Justice Goldberg, Stephen Breyer, a former law clerk to Justice 
Goldberg and current Supreme Court Justice, cited this language about dignity as indica-
tive that Justice Goldberg “has always instinctively seen the law ‘as an opportunity to help 
people obtain social justice’—to aid them in achieving a more productive and civilized ex-
istence.”  Stephen G. Breyer, Mr. Justice Goldberg, 12 FED. BAR NEWS 379 (1965) (quoting 
Judge Bazelon). 
 203. Heymann, supra note 132, at 163. 
 204. See supra text accompanying note 201. 
 205. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(b), 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)). 
 206. “The provisions of this title shall not apply to a private club or other establishment 
not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment 
are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of 
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Justice Goldberg stressed the relationship between public ac-
commodations law and the meaning of community membership.207  He 
referred to an earlier concurrence in which he articulated his convic-
tion that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment “guarantees to all 
Americans the constitutional right ‘to be treated as equal members of 
the community with respect to public accommodations,’ and that 
‘Congress [has] authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
or under the Commerce Clause . . . to implement the rights protected 
by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.’”208
F.  Reactions in the Press to the Court’s Ruling 
 
The Court released its unanimous opinion in Heart of Atlanta Mo-
tel concurrently with its unanimous opinion in the Ollie’s Barbeque 
case, McClung v. Katzenbach, and its 5-to-4 opinion abating the pre-
Title II sit-in convictions, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill.  Press reaction, not 
surprisingly, conjoined the Court’s upholding of Title II with its “kill-
ing” the convictions and highlighted the contrast between the Court 
“acting with rare unanimity” in the first two cases and dividing 5-to-4 
on the fate of the sit-in convictions.209  The Atlanta Constitution’s head-
line read: “Supreme Court Upholds Rights Law in Case Here” and 
continued: “Tells States to Kill All Sit-In Cases.”210  Some northern 
and southern newspapers ran a picture of Moreton Rolleston hearing 
the news by telephone, with a caption that he was “not surprised” by 
the Court’s decision.211  Some featured pictures of Ollie McClung Sr. 
or of the Heart of Atlanta Motel.212
 
subsection (b) of this section.” § 201(e) (codified at  42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e)).  For a list of 
the establishments which are considered “public” under the Act,  see § 201(b) (codified at  
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)).  
  Some quoted and even headlined 
Rolleston’s reaction and prediction: “It makes possible a socialistic 
 207. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between public and private space 
and how public accommodations laws had a predicate in a communitarian and corporatist 
strand of Anglo-American law protecting travelers, see A. K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, 
Strangers, and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in America, 23 L. & HIST. 
REV. 53 (2005).  
 208. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 293 (1964) (quoting 
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 317 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)). 
 209. Andrew Glass, High Court Upholds New Rights Law, Frees All Sit-Ins, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 15, 1964, at 1; High Court Upholds Accommodations Law, Kills Early Sit-in Cases, (Louis-
ville) COURIER-J., Dec. 15, 1964, at 1. 
 210. Supreme Court Upholds Rights Law in Case Here—Tells States To Kill All Sit-in Cases, 
ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15, 1964, at 1, 10. 
 211. Ted Lippman, Supreme Court Upholds Rights Law in Case Here—Dismisses Appeal by Mo-
tel, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15, 1964, at 1, 10. 
 212. Jerry T. Baulch, High Court Ruling Backs Rights Law, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15, 
1964, at 1 (photo of Ollie McClung Sr. “At Work”). 
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state and eventual dictatorship.  This is a sad day for the cause of indi-
vidual freedom.”213
The press reported President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s official 
statement expressing hope for continuing and increasing “reasonable 
and responsible acceptance” of the Civil Rights Act “now that the Su-
preme Court also has ruled” and praising the South for accepting the 
Act, despite initial opposition: 
  
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was proposed by Two Presi-
dents.  It was overwhelmingly adopted by Congress and now 
the constitutionality of its public accommodations section 
has been upheld by a unanimous vote of the Supreme 
Court. 
The nation has spoken with a single voice on the ques-
tion of equal rights and equal opportunity. 
I have been heartened by the spirit with which the 
people of the south have accepted the act even though many 
were opposed to its passage.214
President Johnson, in this statement, links the unanimity of the 
Court to the unified—“single”—voice of the nation.  Civil rights lead-
ers stressed the role of the many sit-ins throughout the South as a cat-
alyst for speaking with this national voice and interpreted the Court’s 
opinion as vindicating those efforts.
 
215  Thus, John Lewis, then a lead-
er of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, hailed the 
Court’s ruling as “the landmark in the struggle for complete social, 
economic and political equality for all Americans,” stating that it “vin-
dicated the thousands of demonstrators who made the civil rights bill 
not only possible but imperative.”216  The press quoted Roy Wilkins, 
executive secretary of the NAACP, as stating that the Court “recog-
nized the justification for the acts of thousands of young people who 
exercised their moral right to equal service even before the [civil 
rights] law was passed.”217
 
 213. Warns Court Opens Door to Socialist U.S., CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1964, at 2; “Socialistic 
State” Foreseen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1964, at 48; see also Achsah Posey, His Fight Is Over, Motel 
Man Says, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15, 1964, at 1, 10. 
  Thus, although reading Heart of Atlanta Mo-
 214. LBJ Hails Acceptance—Praises Southern Reaction to Law, BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, 
Dec. 15, 1964, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 215. Negro Leaders Jubilant Over Rights Decision, Await Compliance, ALA. J., Dec. 15, 1964, at 
10. 
 216. Id.  The reference here to “social equality” is striking, given Justice Harlan’s insis-
tence in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases that access to public accommodations was 
about civil rights, not social rights or compelled social intercourse.  See supra text accom-
panying notes 85–95. 
 217. Warns Court Opens Door to Socialist U.S., supra note 213 (alterations in the original). 
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tel as an isolated text does not reveal this fuller story of struggle and 
transformation, the above quotes suggest that a significant legacy of 
the case is the perception that, in upholding Title II, the Court 
weighed in favorably on and gave added legitimacy to this momentous 
national development.  
President Johnson might have been heartened by the mayor of 
Atlanta’s statement that many states had “had public accommodations 
laws for many years,” and that “Congress had the full right to take the 
same steps to eliminate gross discrimination against individuals on an 
interstate basis,” and by the president of the Atlanta Restaurant Asso-
ciation expressing confidence “that our patrons, customers and 
friends will understand this position” and urging association members 
to comply.218  Georgia Governor Carl Sanders, however, reiterated 
that his opposition to the public accommodations law was “well 
known and a matter of record” (including his Congressional testimo-
ny); rather than echoing President Johnson’s hopes, he stated: “The 
court has acted now, and there is no need for further comment by 
me.”219 Openly critical of the Court and urging resistance, Governor 
George Wallace, in neighboring Alabama, called the decision “a stag-
gering blow to the free enterprise system and the rights of private 
property owners.”220  Wallace erroneously referred back to the Court’s 
earlier decision in the Civil Rights Cases as invalidating “such an act 
under the commerce clause,” and urged: “Despite this setback there 
should be continuing resistance to such attacks on the system that has 
made this nation great and strong.”221
Editorials in some southern newspapers expressed worry about 
Congress’s expansive use of the commerce power and the Supreme 
Court’s “edict,” which “puts virtually no limit on what can be called 
‘interstate commerce’ or on the power of congress to regulate it.”
  
222
 
 218. Posey, supra note 
  
For example, taking a different tone than its op-ed on the signing of 
Title II, the Atlanta Constitution deemed the ruling “no surprise,” call-
ing it “another step in the steady onward march of Federal dominion 
213. 
 219. Id. 
 220. John Williams, ‘Rough Blow’ Wallace Says of Decision, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 
15, 1964, at 1. 
 221. Id.  In contrast to Wallace’s characterization, press analysis noting the Court’s 
change over the last century—from Dred Scott to its 1964 opinions—accurately reported 
that the Commerce Clause was not at issue in the earlier public accommodations law.  It 
also noted that the Court’s reversal “is a reflection of the change in attitude in this country 
toward Negroes.”  James Marlow, 5 Decisions Stand Out in Civil Rights History, ALA. J., Dec. 
16, 1964, at 10.  
 222. David Lawrence, Fateful Day in History, ALA. J., Dec. 16, 1964, at 4. 
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over lives of the people.”  It counseled that “it is a ruling which we 
must live with. Time may bring changes, but certainly not in the fore-
seeable future.”223
It is pointless now to argue whether the ruling was good 
law or bad law: the finding will rule the country in this 
realm.  It is one of the most consequential nullifications of 
property rights in the history of the court . . . . 
  The Montgomery Advertiser similarly combined res-
ignation to living with the Civil Rights Act with a warning of its severe 
deprivation of “sacred” property rights: 
 . . . . 
It may be argued that the throttling of a restaurant’s 
right to choose its clientele or a department store to reject a 
job applicant are benign in purpose.  Even if you account 
the law’s purpose as benevolent, you have to concede that it 
is a grand scale deprivation of property rights previously 
held sacred in this country.224
Similarly, the Birmingham News interpreted the unanimity of the 
Court as probably meaning there was “no real prospect of judicial 
overturning of any other sections in the new act,” even as it observed 
that “the Court has joined Congress in protecting some rights at the 
specific expense of rights of others;” it warned that the decision may 
pose a “grave danger” as a precedent for using government power “to 
act further against private enterprise practices.”
  
225
To return to Rolleston himself: the hotel owner remarked that 
the “decision nullifies the rights and principles which the Constitu-
tion was designed to perpetuate” and “opens the frightful door to un-
limited power of a centralized government in Washington, in which 
the individual citizens and his [sic] personal liberty are of no impor-
tance.”
   
226
 
 223. No Surprise Ruling, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15, 1964, at 4. 
  This statement, perhaps unwittingly, invites attention to 
flaws with the original constitutional scheme, which perpetuated cer-
tain forms of inequality and nullified the very legal status and rights of 
African-Americans.  Moreover, all these reactions evince a more abso-
 224. More to Come, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 1964, at 4.  In one op-ed, the au-
thor criticized the Court’s “edict” for “chang[ing] the whole constitutional system over-
night,” instead of the nation proceeding by constitutional amendment, and concluded: “It 
remains to be seen whether this method of governing the United States will be accepted in 
the long run by the people, and whether they will submit to changes of such far-reaching 
character in American life without the usual constitutional processes being observed.”  
Lawrence, supra note 222. 
 225. Opinion of the Week: At Home and Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1964, at E9 (excerpt-
ing the BIRMINGHAM NEWS). 
 226. Id. (quoting Moreton Rolleston). 
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lute conception of property rights, a conception rejected in the Se-
nate Report, and, implicitly, in Title II. 
Another theme in the press’s reaction to the Court’s ruling in 
Heart of Atlanta Motel and its companion cases is that it is time to move 
on to the next challenges in ending separate but equal and securing 
equality.  Thus, the New York Times cautioned that the decisions were a 
“major step,” but would “by no means . . . eliminate all racial prob-
lems,” for example, integration in the North, where “discrimination 
in public accommodations has long been outlawed.”227
But the issue no longer is a question of legality.  The primary 
concern now is not resistance to the law but the Negro’s po-
verty and inadequate education.  These remaining problems 
can be solved only through massive efforts to deal with de 
facto school segregation and discrimination in jobs and 
housing, which have been the causes of racial unrest in the 
North all along.
  It admo-
nished: 
228
Similarly, a “Negro” civil rights lawyer, Donald L. Hollowell, 
commented: “The decision is most important and extremely gratify-
ing . . . [and now] we can all . . . turn our concerted attention to pro-
moting the general welfare and other basic needs such as jobs, hous-
ing and education.”
 
229  Legal commentators, too, expressed similar 
conviction about the need for “cause seekers” to move on from the 
era of “civil disobedience and the beatings related to public accom-
modations” to remaining challenges, addressed by other parts of the 
Civil Rights Act, such as the “more fertile areas” of “voting rights, em-
ployment and housing.”230
For critics of the Civil Rights Act, by contrast, what lay ahead was 
more encroachments on private rights.  Looking ahead to implement-
ing the Act’s provisions barring discrimination against a job applicant 
based on race or creed, one op-ed warned this was “a hard blow at an 
employer’s right to run his own business according to his own lights 
and prejudices.”
  
231
 
 227. The Nation: Court on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1964, at E2. 
  Maddox himself rode widespread public reaction 
against integration to victory as governor of Georgia.  It is a common 
observation that President Johnson recognized his support for the 
 228. Id. 
 229. Opinion of the Week: At Home and Abroad, supra note 225 (alteration in original). 
 230. Quick, supra note 23, at 709.   
 231. More to Come, supra note 224. 
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Civil Rights Act would cost the Democratic Party the South “for a long 
time to come.”232
III.  THE COMPETING APPEALS TO THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN 
CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF TITLE II 
 
Reading Heart of Atlanta Motel in isolation from the larger context 
of congressional consideration of what became Title II could lead the 
reader to catch only a glimpse of the role the Thirteenth Amendment 
played in the 1964 public accommodations law.  The goal of this Part 
is to illustrate how appeals to the Thirteenth Amendment featured 
both in arguments supporting the bill and opposing it.  Two distinct 
understandings of the Thirteenth Amendment’s relevance were at 
work: to empower Congress to address the intolerable discrimination 
African-Americans still experienced in everyday life, nearly 100 years 
after emancipation, and (as in Rolleston’s argument) to bar Congress 
from compelling “private” businesses to serve customers they did not 
wish to serve.  Given space constraints, I do not attempt an exhaustive 
look, but focus on two sources: the arguments made by the U.S. At-
torney General’s office in support of the public accommodations law 
and any references to the Thirteenth Amendment made in the Senate 
Report on S. 1732,233 the public accommodations bill, and the various 
Individual Views included with it.234
 
 232. SUSAN DUDLEY GOLD, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 115 (2011) (“On the night 
after signing the civil rights bill, President Johnson sadly predicted the political ramifica-
tions of the act.  ‘I think we just delivered the South to the Republican party for a long 
time to come,’ Johnson told his press adviser, Bill Moyers.”  “[H]is words proved true” be-
cause even though he won the 1964 election “in a landslide,” his opponent, Senator Barry 
Goldwater, “received support from the five states of the Deep South (Louisiana, Alabama, 
Mississippi, Georgia, and South Carolina)” and “in the years that followed, the South con-
sistently voted for Republicans for president”).  For contemporary press reports of the 
1964 presidential election outcome, see Tom Wicker, Johnson’s Plurality Sets Record; Many 
Democrats Gain by Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1964, at 1 (reporting that “[o]nly in a belt of 
five states across the Deep South could Mr. Goldwater claim victory for his brand of con-
servatism. In those states his victory margins were rolled up in predominantly segregation-
ist areas”).  Press coverage of Johnson’s 1964 landslide observed that “the most remarkable 
percentages [in Johnson’s landslide] concerned Negro voting”: in the South, in 1956, 
“President Eisenhower won 45 percent of Negroes; in 1960, Mr. Kennedy won 69 percent. 
Tuesday Mr. Johnson polled 95 percent of a sizeable Southern Negro vote.”  Wicker, supra, 
at 21. 
  That examination reveals that 
proponents of the bill shared a concern to remedy what they viewed 
as a significant moral problem, but some were more pragmatic in 
looking for a constitutional hook (commerce) that would avoid the 
 233. This is the Senate version of what became, after a compromise bill, Title II.  
 234. There was less discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment in the House Report, but I 
also consider it. 
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Court overturning the new law. For some lawmakers (as for Justice 
Goldberg), this emphasis upon commerce failed to capture the digni-
ty and citizenship issues at stake.  I conclude this Part by examining 
the rhetoric of a 2004 House Resolution commemorating the fortieth 
anniversary of Congress’s passage of the Civil Rights Act and state-
ments made in support.  One opponent of that resolution, Rep. Ron 
Paul, Republican of Texas, sounded property rights arguments similar 
to those made in opposition to the act and echoed several years later 
when his son (and eventual United States senator from Kentucky) 
Rand Paul found himself in a political firestorm after criticizing Title 
II.235
A.  Testimony by the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General  
 
In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, At-
torney General Robert F. Kennedy advanced a pragmatic view that 
discrimination in public accommodations was a national problem—
and injustice—that required a remedy, and the Commerce Clause 
supplied Congress the authority to provide that remedy.236  The Thir-
teenth Amendment, Kennedy remarked more than once, was also a 
possible foundation for S. 1732; indeed, he stated that it “might very 
well be stronger than the 14th amendment” as a basis because, by 
contrast to the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not have a state action 
requirement.237  While he personally believed that the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments provided additional authority for the law, 
Kennedy repeatedly observed that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the Civil Rights Cases was still “the law of the land” and that resting the 
bill on the Fourteenth Amendment alone—as some senators pro-
posed to do—would put a “heavy burden” on the bill, avoidable if 
Congress used the dual hooks of commerce and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.238  Kennedy praised and indicated agreement with Jus-
tice Harlan’s dissent in that case and predicted that, given how much 
had changed in the eighty years since that opinion, the Court would 
likely sustain a Fourteenth Amendment basis for the law.239
 
 235. See Adam Nagourney & Carl Hulse, Tea Party Pick Causes Uproar on Civil Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2010, at A1.   
  However, 
 236. A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate Commerce: 
Hearings on S. 1732 A Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 28 (1963), [hereinaf-
ter Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 1] (statement of the Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General 
of the United States). 
 237. Id. at 74.  
 238. Id. at 23, 78. 
 239. Id. at 77–78 (noting that, in 1963, there is “more travel,” thus implicating a citizen’s 
right to travel as a privilege and immunity of citizenship and also “that the shipment of 
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because there was reasonable disagreement on the issue, including in 
the Justice Department itself, the more prudent course was relying on 
Congress’s clear authority under the Commerce Clause. 
The Thirteenth Amendment was also a lodestar for Kennedy’s 
testimony about why a national law was necessary to address the harms 
to citizenship and personhood stemming from race-based refusals of 
service and the fact that, nearly one hundred years after emancipa-
tion, blacks still experienced injustice and indignity.  A few passages 
from his testimony are illustrative: “With the adoption of the 13th, 
14th, and 15th amendments, the American Negro was freed from sla-
very and made a citizen in full standing—on paper, at least. But for 
most of the past hundred years we have imposed the duties of citizen-
ship on the Negro without allowing him to enjoy the benefits.”240  
Kennedy further stated: “Plainly, when a customer is turned away 
from such a place because of the color of his skin, it imposes a badge 
of inferiority on that citizen which he has every right to resent.”241
Strikingly, when Senator Strom Thurmond questioned Kenne-
dy’s invocation of the Thirteenth Amendment as a basis for the bill 
and countered, instead, that the only involuntary servitude at issue 
would be that experienced by the business owner, due to the public 
accommodations law, Kennedy’s answer shifted to the unfilled prom-
ises of the Thirteenth Amendment for American Negroes, nearly a 
century after emancipation: 
  
Kennedy also referenced persisting racial inequality as evidence of a 
failure to realize the Thirteenth Amendment.  
When the 13th amendment was written, it involved granting 
to the Negroes all the privileges, rights, and immunities of 
all the other citizens. 
 I think quite frankly, Senator, that there are sections of the 
country where they have never received that and this is a 
whole major effort.  It doesn’t just go to allowing them to go 
into a tavern or barbershop or store of one kind or another.  
It involves that fact that they are not permitted to register or 
vote in elections so they can’t change the system in their 
own State.  It involves the fact they have not had an adequate 
education, so they can’t rise above the lowest positions. . . . 
 Senator, it is 1963. . . .  [A]ll of this effort to keep the Ne-
gro from obtaining really a decent and reasonable life in the 
 
goods, the movement of goods, is far different now than it was during the period of the 
time of the 14th amendment,” with much more state licensing and regulation). 
 240. Id. at 24. 
 241. Id. at 18. 
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United States—it is all part of a system. . . .  [T]herefore, 
[because] they haven’t received all their rights and privileg-
es under the 14th amendment, . . . you could . . . argue 
forcefully that under the 13th amendment that this would 
be declared constitutional.  I think it is a different situation 
than in 1883 because we have gone 80 more years when 
these practices and procedures still exist.242
The testimony of Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General of 
the Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice, parallels Ken-
nedy’s in naming the Thirteenth Amendment as among the constitu-
tional bases for the federal public accommodations bill.  Indeed, Mar-
shall referred to the Civil Rights Cases majority opinion’s belief “that 
[the Thirteenth Amendment] gave Congress the power, not only to 
enact legislation against the institution of slavery itself, as such, but 
against the badges, the remaining badges left over from the previous 
condition of servitude.”
  
243  He added (contrary to Justice Bradley’s 
view, of course, but in keeping with Justice Harlan’s): “One of the 
badges, one of the remnants of the institution of slavery, based on 
race in this country was the denial of access to these places covered by 
this bill [S. 1732].  So that is why I think the 13th amendment posi-
tively gives the Congress power to move in this area.”244  However, 
Marshall also—like Kennedy—stressed the pragmatic case for resting 
primarily on Congress’s Commerce Clause power and the “heavy bur-
den” Congress would put on the bill—in light of the Civil Rights Cas-
es—if it rested solely on the Fourteenth Amendment.245  Thus, Mar-
shall conceded, under the 1883 case, “Congress did not have the 
power under the 13th or 14th amendment to compel the proprietors 
to render service to Negroes.”246
Marshall, like Kennedy, sounded moral themes of a long overdue 
remedy for intolerable racial discrimination.  He observed that estab-
lishments “in business to serve the public” practice “systematized and 
complete” racial discrimination, subjecting “countless members of the 
public—citizens of this country guaranteed equality of treatment by 
our Constitution” to “daily suffer the humiliation of being denied ser-
 
 
 242. Id. at 118–19. 
 243. Id. at 231–32 (statement of Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights 
Division, Department of Justice). 
 244. Id. at 232 (insertion added). 
 245. On the Thirteenth Amendment as a basis for the law, see id. at 206, 230–31.  On 
the “heavy burden” point, see id. at 248.  
 246. Id. at 208. 
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vice for no reason other than the color of their skin.”247  Pointing to 
the escalation in the number of sit-ins and demonstrations with re-
spect to segregated facilities as evidence of “the intensity with which 
millions of our citizens resent this treatment,” Marshall asserted, “no 
problem is of greater immediate importance than discrimination in 
places of public accommodation.”248  Asked to defend this statement, 
Marshall clarified “that the need for curing this problem goes back a 
very long way,” but it was the intensification of the demonstrations—
and the support for them, along with the failure of voluntary and per-
suasive efforts in some localities—that made the matter so urgent.249  
When asked whether the public accommodations bill “aim[s] at the 
thing which is the point of highest irritation and frustration and of-
fense,” Marshall answered that this was “true in the places where this 
kind of discrimination exists,” and that the bill “would bear very heavi-
ly upon how 18 or 19 million Americans feel they are looked upon by 
their Government.”250
Marshall combined the pragmatic concern with fashioning a bill 
that could deal with the Supreme Court’s Civil Rights Cases “8-to-1 de-
cision” with the urgent need “to deal with the substantive problems, 
the substantive evil, that is causing a great deal of turmoil, and is 
permitting to continue a system of injustice and racial intolerance in 
this country.”
 
251  When senators pressed the point that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was better suited to remedy bias, prejudice, and discrim-
ination than the commerce power, Marshall reiterated the risk of rely-
ing “solely” on the Fourteenth Amendment and stated that Congress 
had the power, under commerce, to deal “now” with a “very urgent” 
national problem.252 Marshall, like Kennedy, did state that the 1883 
“case could be distinguished in some sense,” due to changes in the 
degree of state regulation of business “and the fact that in many plac-
es these practices have been required or encouraged, not only tole-
rated . . . by State officials and State laws and local officials and local 
ordinances.”253
 
 247. Id. at 205. 
 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. at 214–15. 
 250. Id. at 237–38. 
 251. Id. at 220. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 224. 
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B. The Senate Report on S. 1732 
Congress did not explicitly rely on the Thirteenth Amendment, 
notwithstanding Kennedy’s comments about it as a possible founda-
tion.  The Senate Report candidly notes the “formidable obstacle to a 
favorable determination” that the 1883 Supreme Court holding con-
cerning the 1875 public accommodation law posed “[a]t the out-
set.”254  Here, it mentions the Court’s rejection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a basis because of the lack of state action; it does not 
mention the Thirteenth Amendment ruling in the case.  Noting the 
“large body of legal thought” that believed the Court might reverse 
that decision or distinguish it, the Report stated: “That question, 
however, was not before the committee, for the instant measure is 
based on the commerce clause,” which the 1883 opinion did not fo-
reclose as a basis for a public accommodations statute.255  It refers to 
an Appendix to the Senate Report, a memorandum prepared by con-
stitutional law scholar Paul Freund, Constitutional Bases for the Public 
Accommodations Bill, which led with—and concentrated upon—
Congress’s authority to enact the law under the commerce power.256  
The memo concluded that “[t]he commerce power is clearly ade-
quate and appropriate,” and also counseled: “No impropriety need be 
felt in using the commerce clause as a response to a deep moral con-
cern.  Where social injustices occur in commercial activities the com-
merce power is a natural and familiar means for dealing with 
them.”257  This theme of Congress properly addressing a moral prob-
lem through the commerce power features in the Senate Report and, 
as discussed in Part II, in the Court’s Heart of Atlanta Motel opinion.  
With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, Freund offered some 
thoughts about why the Court had not overruled the Civil Rights Cases 
decision and explored what kind of rights an overruling of the cases 
“would create for the courts and for Congress to enforce.”258
The Senate Report also situates the law in the framework of 
common law obligations of innkeepers and rejects (as quoted in Jus-
tice Douglas’s opinion) private property objections to the bill.  Simi-
 
 
 254. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 12. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 82–92 (Appendix, Constitutional Bases for the Public Accommodations Bill).  
 257. Id. at 92. 
 258. Id.  Freund added, “The Court may be the readier to accept this basis for the legis-
lation if a consensus is reached as to those principles by the proponents of this constitu-
tional approach.”  He concluded that it is “uncertain” whether the Supreme Court would 
sustain the legislation under that basis “because of the necessity to find principles of inclu-
sion and exclusion in opening up a new class of constitutional claims against private en-
terprises.”  Id. 
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larly, Freund deflects objections rooted in property and associational 
rights: “There is no serious question of the right of association or of 
property or of privacy as a barrier to the legislation, applicable as it is 
to commercial places of public accommodation.”259
The Report does not explicitly mention the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.  It clearly treats the new public accommodations law, however, 
as affording a long-overdue remedy.  The Senate Report looks back to 
the 1875 Act and to the recommendations, made in the 1947 Report 
of President Harry S. Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights titled To 
Secure Those Rights, that states enact public accommodations laws (and 
better enforce the ones they have).  It states: “This bill, then, is the 
second attempt to achieve Federal legislation and the third time equal 
access to public accommodations has been recommended as a na-
tional goal.”
 
260  Appropriately, then, the theme of the unfinished 
business of eradicating the legacy of slavery is very strong, as is its im-
plicit invocation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s broad aim of equal 
civil liberties.261
C. Explicit Reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment to Support the Public 
Accommodations Bill: Senator Prouty’s Individual Views 
  
Accompanying the Senate Report were the individual views of 
several senators.  An impassioned statement offering the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments as a better foundation than the com-
merce power featured in the individual views of Senator Winston L. 
Prouty, a Republican from Vermont.  Prouty maintained that because 
human dignity was at stake in discrimination, to label this as a matter 
of commerce insulted such dignity.262
 
 259. Id.  
  He offered alternative bills: 
one resting solely on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and another adding them to the commerce power.  In support, Prou-
ty attached to the Senate Report over 200 pages of law review articles 
and Supreme Court opinions (primarily about the Fourteenth 
 260. Id. at 11. 
 261. The Senate Report quotes President Kennedy on “how deeply our Negro citizens 
resent the injustice of being arbitrarily denied equal access to those facilities and accom-
modations which are otherwise open to the general public. . . .   Surely, in 1963, 100 years 
after emancipation, it should not be necessary for any American citizen to demonstrate in 
the streets for the opportunity to stop at a hotel, or to eat at a lunch counter in the very 
department store in which he is shopping, or to enter a motion picture house, on the 
same terms as any other customer.”  Id. at 8–9. 
 262. S. REP. NO. 88-872, pt. 2 (1964) (Individual Views of Sen. Winston L. Prouty). 
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Amendment).263  Although the Thirteenth Amendment is the focus of 
this Article, it bears mention that Prouty’s Fourteenth Amendment 
argument appealed to the Citizenship Clause—the first clause of Sec-
tion 1, which does not have a state action requirement.264  He pursued 
both his Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments when 
questioning constitutional law scholar Erwin Griswold in the Senate 
hearings.  Griswold expressed initial skepticism about whether Con-
gress could “describe and define incidents of national citizenship to 
include national protection of civil rights,” but then commented that 
Prouty’s idea had potential and that perhaps it could be stated that 
“Congress was, in doing this, defining and prescribing the rights of 
citizens of the United States under the 14th amendment.”265
Turning to the Thirteenth Amendment, Prouty included his ex-
change with Griswold, in which Prouty invoked Justice Harlan’s view 
in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases “that there are burdens and dis-
abilities which constitute badges of slavery and servitude and that 
Congress had the power to enact legislation of a direct and primary 
character” to eradicate not only the institution of slavery, but also 
those “badges and incidents.”  He then asked Griswold, “Would you 
say that segregation as a system is ‘slavery’ within the contemplation of 
the framers of the 13th amendment?” to which Griswold said, “Yes, I 
think so.”
  
266
This is quite consistent with, and is in support of, the posi-
tion I have suggested here; that in addition to the commerce 
clause and the 14th amendment, Congress should definitely 
utilize its powers under the 13th amendment in passing the 
pending bill.   
  Prouty quoted Griswold’s further response:  
 
 263. Part 2 of Senate Report No. 88-872 consists entirely of Prouty’s individual views, 
alternative bills, and materials attached to the Report. 
 264. For a contemporary argument about Congress’s power under the Citizenship 
Clause, see Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801 (2010). 
 265. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 262, at 6.  Prouty also reproduces Griswold’s answer 
to Senator Pastore where, in discussing the Civil Rights Cases, Griswold observes that it in-
volved Section 2, not Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Edwards v. Cali-
fornia could 
furnish strong authority for saying that Congress, under section 1 and section 5 
of the 14th amendment, has power to prescribe that the right to move freely 
from State to State—and that includes being accommodated when you move, 
because you can’t move and just sleep in the ditch by the side of the road—is a 
right which Congress can prescribe under the 14th amendment. 
Id. 
 266. Id. at 7. 
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 Justice Harlan used “badges” of slavery. I said “vestiges” of 
slavery.  I think we mean exactly the same thing.267
Like Kennedy, Prouty viewed contemporary discrimination as a 
legacy—a vestige—of slavery.  He contended that, based on his “read-
ing of the legislative history of the 13th and 14th amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution, . . . the intention of the framers to elevate the freed 
slaves to full civil freedom has been sidetracked by history.  Various 
judicial, legislative, and executive obstructions have fallen across the 
path to full citizenship.”
 
268  His bill, resting in the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, instead of the commerce power, “sought to 
abolish the historical consequences of slavery and enable the son of 
the slave to attain the full stature of citizenship,” specifically, the fed-
eral citizenship that “was made dominant over State citizenship,” with 
the enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.269  
Prouty found in the testimony of Robert Kennedy (including the pas-
sages I cite above) support for his own argument that discrimination 
is an “affront to citizenship” and that the basis for a public accommo-
dations law that protects dignity should be citizenship, not com-
merce.270
In support of his Thirteenth Amendment argument, Prouty puts 
into the Senate Report “the very valuable law review article” by equali-
ty theorist Jacobus tenBroek,
  
271 which supports the interpretation of 
the Thirteenth Amendment as broadly conceived to obliterate the in-
cidents of slavery and protect “the emancipated negro and his white 
friends . . . in the privileges and civil liberties of free men.”272  Profes-
sor tenBroek identifies a critical question: “What was the ‘slavery’ 
which the Thirteenth Amendment would abolish?”273  Based on his 
study of the legislative debates, he observes that “[t]he opposite of sla-
very is liberty,” but the liberty was “itemized and detailed,” in terms of 
securing the former slave’s “natural and God-given rights,” and af-
fording the “equal protection under the law.”274
 
 267. Id. 
  He concludes that 
 268. Id. at 8. 
 269. Id. at 9. 
 270. Id. at 10–11. 
 271. Id. at 7 (referring to the article as Appendix F).  The article, Jacobus tenBroek, 
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States—Consummation to Abolition and Key 
to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951), appears at S. REP. NO. 88-872, su-
pra note 262, at 223–55.  The original page numbers of the article appear to have been 
removed for inclusion as an Appendix to the Report.  
 272. Jacobus tenBroek, supra note 271, at 176.  
 273. Id. at 179. 
 274. Id. at 179–80 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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both proponents of the Thirteenth Amendment and those who 
feared its consequences agreed on a broad conception of the “slavery” 
that would be abolished: “the involuntary personal servitude of the 
bondman; the denial to the blacks, bond and free, of their natural 
rights through the failure of the government to protect them and to 
protect them equally; [and] the denial to the whites of their natural 
and constitutional rights through a similar failure of government.”275 
Proponents and opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment both un-
derstood that it intended a “revolution in federalism.”276
[T]he Thirteenth Amendment either gave or confirmed 
congressional power to enforce a constitutional prohibition 
against slavery everywhere in the United States; and the li-
berty which Congress now had constitutional mandate to en-
force was not just the liberty of the blacks but the liberty of 
the whites as well and included not just freedom from per-
sonal bondage but protection in a wide range of natural and 
constitutional rights.
  Professor 
tenBroek explains this revolution:  
277
However, when Congress subsequently debated the civil rights bills 
and the Freedmen’s Bureau bill—legislation intended to implement 
the Thirteenth Amendment and obliterate the “infamous Black 
Codes” that replaced the slave codes—opponents of the Thirteenth 
Amendment “now switched to a restrictive interpretation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment,” such that “[t]he evil of Negro elevation and 
equality which they had loudly proclaimed it would bring about they 
now insisted had not been intended to be achieved by it.”
 
278  This 
“narrow constructionist argument” about “the meaning of ‘slavery’ 
and its abolition”—for example, that it “merely dissolved the relation 
of master and slave”—featured as a ground for opposing measures to 
“wipe out the remnants, badges and indicia of slavery.”279
Opposing this narrow constructionist view, “Senator Trumbull, a 
principal draftsman both of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil 
Rights Bill,” referred to the Declaration of Independence and the pri-
vileges and immunities of citizens in the Constitution and exclaimed: 
  
 
 275. Id. at 180. 
 276. Id. at 174. 
 277. Id. at 183. 
 278. Id. at 188, 189. 
 279. Id. at 189, 186. 
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“It is the intention of this [Civil Rights] bill to secure those rights.”280  
Any statute that does not treat citizens equally and “deprived any citi-
zen of civil rights which are secured to other citizens” is a “badge of 
servitude.”281  Professor tenBroek argues that the repeated references 
in the debates to the “full” and “equal” enjoyment of rights point to a 
“broad” and “far flung” idea of equal protection.282  That protection is 
“[a]t the very foundation of the system constructed out of the Thir-
teenth Amendment and the Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights 
Bill.”283  He concludes that the sponsors of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment viewed it “as doing the whole job—not just cutting loose the fet-
ters which bound the physical person of the slave; but restoring to 
him his natural, inalienable and civil rights; or what was the same 
thing in other words, guaranteeing to him the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States.”284  Slavery’s opposite is liberty, 
“[b]ut liberty in society, civil liberty, consists of natural liberty as re-
strained by human laws protecting all men in their antecedent rights 
and being both general and equal.”285  He further concludes that 
“[t]he Thirteenth Amendment nationalized the right of freedom,” 
and the “equal right of all to enjoy protection in those natural rights 
which constitute that freedom.”286  The Fourteenth Amendment, 
passed after doubts arose about the adequacy of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, “reenacted” the Thirteenth and “made the program of 
legislation designed to implement it constitutionally secure or a part 
of the Constitution.”287
Professor tenBroek’s article, thus, appears in the Senate Report 
as support for Prouty’s appeal to the Thirteenth Amendment as a 
foundation for the 1964 Act. His historical analysis tends to buttress 
Prouty’s argument that, under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress 
has the power to enact legislation to eradicate the badges and inci-
dents of slavery, but “that the intention of the framers to elevate the 
freed slaves to full civil freedom has been sidetracked by history.”
  
288
 
 280. Id. at 190–91.  Professor tenBroek explains that “[m]any other speeches are to the 
same effect.”  Id. at 192 n.46 (giving numerous examples using language of “securing” or 
“protecting” rights). 
  
 281. Id. at 191. 
 282. Id. at 199–200. 
 283. Id. at 200. 
 284. Id.  
 285. Id.  
 286. Id. at 203.  
 287. Id.  
 288. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 262, at 8 (Individual Views of Sen. Winston L. Prou-
ty).  
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In this context, the Civil Rights Cases are a primary example of the sort 
of “obstruction” of this “path to full citizenship.”289
To return again to Trumbull’s invocation of the Declaration of 
Independence, it is striking that the phrase “to secure those rights” is 
echoed some eighty years later, in the title to President Harry S. Tru-
man’s Committee on Civil Rights report.
 
290  The report takes note of 
“the fate of the civil rights program developed by Congress following 
the close of the Civil War,” with an earlier Supreme Court striking 
down (in the Civil Rights Cases) the 1875 public accommodations 
act.291  The report observes that Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil 
Rights Cases is “a particularly powerful statement,” noting that “[a]s in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court the Constitution does not guarantee 
equal access to places of public accommodation and amusement.”292  
In light of this constitutional interpretation, the report expresses the 
“hope that enforcement will make practice more compatible with 
theory” in the “[eighteen] states that have already enacted [antidi-
scrimination statutes]” while recommending that “all of the states 
should enact such legislation, using the broadest possible definition 
of public accommodation.”293  Written before Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,294 the report recommended “[t]he elimination of segregation, 
based on race, color, creed, or national origin, from American life.”295  
The Thirteenth Amendment is one of “several specific constitutional 
bases” it identifies “for federal action in the civil rights field.”  As Re-
becca Zietlow has observed, “[t]he 1964 Civil Rights Act incorporated 
a number of the recommendations” contained in this report.296
 
 289. Id. at 8, 10. 
  It was 
this report, along with the 1875 Act, the Senate Report referred to 
when it observed that the 1964 Civil Rights Act was the third time it 
had recommended a public accommodations law.  
 290. Steven F. Lawson, Preface to TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF PRESIDENT 
HARRY S. TRUMAN’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, at iv (Steven F. Lawson ed., 2004) 
(1947) [hereinafter Lawson, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS]. 
 291. Id. at 131. 
 292. Id. at 109, 131.  The report observes that “[e]ighteen states have statutes prohibit-
ing discrimination in places of public accommodation”—although the states’ actual “prac-
tice does not necessarily conform to the law”—but “[twenty] states by law compel segrega-
tion in one way or another.”  Id. at 109–10. 
 293. Id. at 183. 
 294. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
 295. See Lawson, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 290, at 179 (determining that 
“[t]here is no adequate defense of segregation”). 
 296. Rebecca Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 945 n.1 (2005). 
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D.  The House Report and Individual Views 
There is far less discussion concerning the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and involuntary servitude in the House Report (and its accom-
panying individual views) on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Nonethe-
less, the “general statement” in the Report presents a strong theme 
that the new civil rights bill will rectify longstanding injustices and se-
cure the substantive rights of citizenship, thus addressing unfinished 
business concerning the end of slavery: 
Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipation, 
Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our population, 
are by virtue of one or another type of discrimination not 
accorded the rights, privileges, and opportunities which are 
considered to be, and must be, the birthright of all citi-
zens.297
The House Report finds that the “national need” for “national 
legislation” is evident from the slow progress made in eliminating dis-
crimination, the “growing impatience by the victims of discrimina-
tion,” and “a growing recognition on the part of all our people of the 
incompatibility of such discrimination with our ideals and the prin-
ciples to which this country is dedicated.”
  
298  Indeed, like the Recon-
struction Congress and the 1947 report, the House Report speaks of 
the need “to secure these rights”: “A number of provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States clearly supply the means to secure 
these rights, and H.R. 7152, as amended, resting upon this authority, 
is designed as a step toward eradicating significant areas of discrimi-
nation on a nationwide basis.”299
Several representatives, nonetheless, felt there was “a need for 
fuller documentation of the reasons for the bill,” and, in their addi-
tional views, explicitly linked the current bill to the unfinished busi-
ness of Reconstruction.  They led with the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Sections 1 and 5: “Almost a century has elapsed since its ratification, 
yet not since Reconstruction has Congress enacted legislation fully 
implementing the article.  A key purpose of the bill, then, is to secure 
to all Americans the equal protection of the laws of the United States 
and of the several States.”
 
300
 
 297. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18 (1963). 
  They also implicitly appealed to the 
Thirteenth Amendment by asserting that, over one hundred years 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 1 (1963) (Additional Views of Hon. William M. 
McCulloch et al.). 
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since emancipation, “the Negro continues to bear the burdens of a 
race under the traces of servitude,” evident by “the barrier[s] of racial 
inequality” in “employment, education, public service, amusement, 
housing, and citizenship.”301  Defending Title II, the Congressmen 
characterized access to public accommodations “regardless of the 
color of his skin” as “[a]nother signpost of freedom [that] must be ex-
tended to the Negro if he is to overcome racial inequality and if our 
country is to live up to its national ideas.”302  They asserted: “This right 
is so distinctive in its nature that its denial constitutes a shocking refu-
tation of a free society.”303  They contended that nondiscrimination in 
such places is a demand of “the badge of citizenship—extended to 
Negro as well as white by the 14th amendment,” and they would 
ground Title II not only in the commerce power—here confirming 
Congress’s power to legislate on moral and social grounds—but also 
in the Fourteenth Amendment.304  They dismissed the “freedom of 
association” and “rights of privacy” objections to Title II as “ludicrous” 
in light of the distinction between establishments holding themselves 
open to the public and private organizations and the existence of 
public accommodations laws in thirty-two states.305
E.  The Equation of “Rendering Involuntary Service” with “Involuntary 
Servitude”: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Oppose the Civil 
Rights Bill 
 
In Part II, I reviewed how Moreton Rolleston, owner of the Heart 
of Atlanta Motel, unsuccessfully asserted that Title II, as applied to his 
motel, constituted involuntary servitude.  In Congress, some lawmak-
ers made similar claims.  I will discuss the example of Senator Strom 
Thurmond, whose “individual views” are attached to the Senate Re-
port on the public accommodations law.306
 
 301. Id. at 2. 
  For Thurmond, the “only 
valid application” of the Thirteenth Amendment to the law was as 
 302. Id. at 7. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 7–8. 
 305. Id. at 9. 
 306. The Minority Report to the House Report does not explicitly raise the involuntary 
servitude objection to Title II.  It objects to the reported bill as “the greatest grasp for executive 
power conceived in the 20th century.”  H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, supra note 300, at 64 (Committee 
on Judiciary Minority Report).  Among the many civil rights it asserts that the new bill will 
“seriously impair” is “[t]he right of owners of inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, cafeterias, 
lunchrooms, soda fountains, motion picture houses, theaters, concert halls, sports arenas, 
stadiums and other places of entertainment to freely carry on their businesses in the ser-
vice of their customers (title II, title VI, and title VII).”  Id. at 64–65. 
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“proof of the unconstitutionality of this measure,” not as a support for 
it.307
On the narrow construction point, Thurmond challenges the 
hearing’s reference to the Thirteenth Amendment as a source of au-
thority—additional to the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment—for Title II, stating that “the misplaced reliance on this 
amendment should not go unanswered.”
  Even while taking what tenBroek would call a “narrow construc-
tionist” reading of the Thirteenth Amendment with respect to how to 
interpret the “badges” of slavery, Thurmond invokes the term “invo-
luntary servitude” broadly to describe the burden of Title II on prop-
erty owners and their employees.  
308  Thurmond draws paral-
lels between historical and contemporary arguments that denial of 
access to public accommodation was “[o]ne of the badges . . . of the 
institution of slavery,” asserting: “there is no more validity to it now 
than the Court conceded to it in the opinion handed down in 
1883.”309  Thurmond quotes the passage from the Court’s opinion in 
which Justice Bradley refers to such an interpretation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment as “running the slavery argument into the 
ground.”310  Thurmond stresses that the members of the Court lived 
“through the purported abolition of the institution of slavery” and the 
adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, 
and thus “a clear understanding of the purposes of the amendments 
can be attributed to them.”311  Thurmond also offers additional ar-
guments about why denial of access to public accommodations is not 
a badge or vestige of slavery, including the existence of such discrimi-
nation in states outside of the South that have “never known slavery” 
and testimony before Congress “that discrimination on account of 
race, color, religion, or national origin is not unique to the United 
States, but may be found in many other countries.”312
Turning to how the Thirteenth Amendment, in his view, does ap-
ply to Title II—as “an insurmountable constitutional barrier,” he 
turns from the Amendment’s abolition of slavery to its prohibition of 
involuntary servitude.  Thurmond’s rationale is that the new law “does 
authorize, even necessitate, involuntary servitude,” because “there is 
no constitutional right for any individual to demand service in the 
 
 
 307. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 43 (Individual Views of Sen. Strom Thurmond). 
 308. Id. at 49. 
 309. Id. at 50 (discussing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)). 
 310. Id. at 51 (same). 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 52. 
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purely private establishments which would be covered by this bill.”313  
By contrast, “[t]here does now exist a right of ownership of private 
property,” which, case law indicates, allows a private property owner 
to be “‘irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his personal re-
lations’ and still be free from arbitrary governmental interference.”314  
Title II would “give[] legal sanction to a totally new and dangerous 
principle” by “constrict[ing] the personal and property rights of all 
American individuals in an attempt to create a privilege for the fa-
vored few.”315  Patrons of “private establishments would retain their 
right to pick and choose among the many,” but an establishment 
owner would lose his “right to pick and choose [his] customers.”  
“Who can deny that this amounts to involuntary servitude?”316
Thurmond finds support for his interpretation of “involuntary 
servitude” as covering “so-called antidiscrimination laws which compel 
one person to serve another” in a dissenting opinion in a 1959 Wash-
ington State case upholding the state’s public accommodations law.  
He quotes Judge Mallery, in dissent, on why the Thirteenth Amend-
ment should bar such laws, asserting analogies between forms of 
“compelled” service: 
 
Negroes should be familiar with this amendment.  Since its 
passage, they have not been compelled to serve any man 
against their will.  When a white woman is compelled against 
her will to give a Negress a Swedish massage, that too is invo-
luntary servitude . . . . 
 Through what an arc the pendulum of Negro rights has 
swung since the extreme position of the Dred Scott decision.  
Those rights reached dead center when the 13th amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution abolished the ancient wrong 
of Negro slavery.  This court has now swung to the opposite 
extreme in its opinion subjecting white people to “involun-
tary servitude” to Negroes.317
This state court judge, quoted by Thurmond, no doubt chose a 
deliberately racially provocative example of a white woman having to 
touch a black woman, perhaps in a state of undress, in order to stir 
 
 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. (quoting Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1964)). 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 53 (alteration in original) (quoting Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 341 P.2d 
859, 869 (Wash. 1959) (en banc) (Mallery, J., dissenting)). 
McClainFinalBookProof-NEW 12/7/2011  10:17 AM 
2011] THE LEGACY OF HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL, INC. 139 
fears of unwanted and uncomfortable racial mixing—a different pa-
radigm case than someone trying to get food at a lunch counter.318
The simple equation made by Thurmond and by this judge be-
tween “servitude” and serving customers relies on the characterization 
of such businesses as entirely “private” and, in so doing, ignores (as I 
discussed above) the background rules of the English common law 
concerning the duty of innkeepers and other businesses who put out 
a sign and are open to the public. Moreover, the reference to the 
pendulum swing also is evocative of Justice Bradley, who suggested in 
the Civil Rights Cases, that there must come a point when the Negro 
ceases being a “special favorite of the laws” and must stand on his own 
feet.
 
319  Similarly, Thurmond concludes that the public accommoda-
tions law “directs an invasion of private property by a favored class of 
individuals and assures them the assistance of the Federal Govern-
ment in their efforts.  It amounts to a first and significant step toward 
the complete control of private lives and property, obliterating the 
remaining freedom of the individual.”320
Thurmond buttresses his Thirteenth Amendment argument 
against the public accommodations law by citing to “a very scholarly 
and well-prepared brief . . .  submitted for the record by Mr. Alfred 
Avins, on behalf of the Liberty Lobby.”
  
321  Avins—evidently a “prolific 
writer on public accommodations law”322
 
 318. The Washington case involved a refusal to wait on an African-American woman at a 
salon that advertised that it would provide a sample “slenderizing treatment.”  No details 
are provided about the nature of the treatment.  See Browning, 341 P.2d at 861 (majority 
opinion). For many readers, this mention of the fear of unwanted racial mixing may bring 
to mind that, in 2003, several months after Senator Thurmond’s death, his family ac-
knowledged that 78-year-old retired school teacher Essie Mae Washington-Williams was 
Thurmond’s biracial, nonmarital daughter.  She was born, in 1925, to a black teenage 
housekeeper in the Thurmond household with whom Thurmond had sexual relations 
when he was 22 years old.  David Mattingly, Strom Thurmond’s Family Confirms Paternity 
Claim, CNN.com (Dec. 16, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/12/15/thurmond.paternity/index.html?iref=allsearch.  
Essie Mae Washington-Williams learned that Thurmond was her father and met him when 
she was 16; thereafter, he provided some financial support and they had intermittent con-
tact over the years.  Rebecca Leung, Essie Mae on Strom Thurmond, CBS NEWS, Feb. 11, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/17/60II/main589107.shtml.  
—advanced in his writing the 
view that public accommodation laws gave African-Americans “special 
privileges,” and that “civil rights laws, which started as a way of giving 
 319. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).  
 320. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 75–76. 
 321. Id. at 53; A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate 
Commerce: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 1202 (1963) [he-
reinafter Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 2] (statement of Alfred Avins on behalf of the Liberty 
Lobby). 
 322. Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 168, at 1299 n.37. 
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Negroes the same rights as everybody else, have culminated in a sys-
tem giving them more rights than anybody else.”323  In the “brief” to 
which Thurmond refers, Avins canvasses case law about involuntary 
servitude and extracts from it a principle he repeatedly asserts: “To 
coerce personal service is to impose involuntary servitude.”324  The ju-
risprudence on the common law obligation of innkeepers and other 
establishments open to the public stresses the “duty to serve,” but 
Avins instead equates “rendering involuntary service” with “involunta-
ry servitude.”325  Avins focuses not only on the rights of the owner of 
the commercial establishment, but also on the employee who must 
render the service or refuse, on pain of the punishment of leaving his 
job (violating his constitutional “right to work”).326  Avins warns: 
“however compelling the need may seem that individuals serve others 
in particular situations, such a requirement flies in the face of the 
strong and clear policy of the 13th Amendment.”327  Avins quotes lan-
guage from the Supreme Court, declaring that “‘[t]he undoubted aim 
of the 13th amendment . . . was not merely to end slavery but to main-
tain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the 
United States’” and warns that “[t]he clear words of this amendment 
cannot be frittered away by subtle subterfuge or refined legaleze.”328  
Avins argues that the arbitrariness of the refusal to serve makes no dif-
ference—a contention also made by Thurmond about the rights of 
private property owners.329
 
 323. Alfred Avins, What Is a Place of “Public” Accommodation?, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 59, 69 
(1968) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).  Singer explains that Avins’s ar-
gument was that the 1875 public accommodations law did so by cutting back on states’ 
ability to repeal the common law right of access, which some states had done to avoid giv-
ing African-Americans a right of access.  Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 
  Avins concludes with a supposedly “com-
pelling” historical irony “that in 1963, Negroes are demanding laws to 
compel whites to serve them in the very same occupations which they 
themselves were freed from serving whites in 1863, and demanding 
168, at 1299 
n.37. 
 324. Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 2, supra note 321, at 1209 (statement of Alfred Avins). 
 325. On these common law duties, see id. at 1202 (“A statute which requires one person 
to render involuntary service to another immediately raises the question of its constitutio-
nality under the 13th amendment.”); Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 168, at 1439–43 
(discussing the common law implications of public right of access laws). 
 326. See Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 2, supra note 321, at 1212–15 (statement of Alfred Avins) 
(explaining how forcing individuals to serve minorities or lose their job “constitutes such a 
degree of coercion as to make the service involuntary”). 
 327. Id. at 1215. 
 328. Id. at 1215–16 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Pollock v. Wil-
liams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1914)). 
 329. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 63 (“The fundamental attribute of property is 
the right to exclude others.”) (citations omitted). 
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this under the name of ‘freedom.’”330  Avins appeals to the broad in-
tended scope of the Thirteenth Amendment—to “‘reach[] every race 
and every individual’” and be “a charter of universal freedom for all 
persons.”331
But this freedom, in his view, is wholly compatible with discrimi-
nation.  Like Thurmond, Avins quotes dissenting Judge Mallery’s 
statement about the pendulum swing to “subjecting white people to 
‘involuntary servitude’ to Negroes,” adding this further quote: 
“[D]iscrimination is but another word for free choice.  Indeed, he 
would not be free himself if he had no right so to do.  In dealings be-
tween men, both cannot be free unless each acts voluntarily, other-
wise one is subjected to the other’s will.”
   
332
F.  The 2004 Commemoration of the Civil Rights Act and Dissenting 
Views in 2004 and 2010 
 
In 2004, the House of Representatives adopted—with one “nay” 
vote—a resolution honoring the fortieth anniversary of congressional 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and “encourag[ing] all Ameri-
cans to recognize and celebrate the important historical milestone” of 
such passage.333  The language of the resolution and the rhetoric of 
the lawmakers speaking in support of it have little to do with goods 
moving in commerce and much to do with the same kind of argu-
ments that supported Title II itself: appeals to political morality and 
to a long struggle to secure equality.334  That resolution recognizes the 
civil rights movement as a catalyst to the passage of the Act: “[T]he 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the result of decades of struggle and sacri-
fice of many Americans who fought for equality and justice.”335
 
 330. See Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 2, supra note 
  It also 
implicitly recognizes the Act as a long-overdue remedy to a national 
problem of discrimination: “Whereas generations of Americans of 
every background supported Federal legislation to eliminate discrim-
321, at 1216 (continuing that “a century 
ago, Negroes had a near monopoly on the service occupations now engaged in by em-
ployees of so-called ‘places of public accommodation’”).   
 331. Id. at 1217–18 (quoting Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1906)). 
 332. Id. at 1218–19 (quoting Browning v. Slenderalla Sys., 341 P.2d 859, 868 (Wash. 
1959) (en banc) (Mallery, J., dissenting)). 
 333. Honoring 40th Anniversary of Passage of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 150 CONG. REC. 
13,661, 13,661–62 (2004) [hereinafter 40th Anniversary]. 
 334. Cf. Zietlow, supra note 296, at 948 (arguing that the “forthright discussion of fun-
damental constitutional and moral values” in the congressional debate over the 1964 Act 
makes the debate “particularly rich in constitutional meaning”). 
 335. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,661. 
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ination against African Americans.”336  The resolution “applaud[s] all 
those whose support and efforts lead [sic] to passage” of the Act, the 
“most comprehensive civil rights legislation in our Nation’s history.”337
The individual statements by members of Congress in support of 
House Resolution 676 also recognize the role of struggle in bringing 
about the Act (including those by members of Congress who were, at 
the time, civil rights leaders and activists, such as Rep. John Lewis of 
Georgia
 
338 and Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton of the District of Co-
lumbia339).  Representative Lewis himself reminded his colleagues 
that “the Civil Rights Act of 1964 just did not happen,” but “took 
many years, many months of struggle on the part of a disciplined and 
organized movement that created . . . an environment for action” by 
the President and Congress.340  Lewis situated the Act in the environ-
ment of “the American south” of the 1950s and 1960s, where 
“[s]egregation and discrimination were the order of the day,” and 
where, as a child and then a “participant in the civil rights move-
ment,” he saw the “white” and “colored” signs marking stores, train 
stations, restaurants, and hotels.341  He recalls that the nonviolent ef-
forts of “ordinary people,” met by beatings, jailings, and killings, and 
then the death of the four young girls in a church bombing, created a 
“righteous indignation,” where “[a]ll across America, by the hundreds 
and thousands, people started demanding that the Federal Govern-
ment act.”342  Because of this action and the response by two presi-
dents and Congress, America has witnessed “a nonviolent revolution 
in America, a revolution of values, a revolution of ideas.”343  America 
today, he concluded, is a “better Nation, we are a better people, better 
in the process of laying down the burdens of race.”344
 
 336. Id. 
  This language 
of burden, of course, brings to mind shedding the badges and inci-
dents of slavery, of which segregation was one component.  In 2011, 
Lewis, who was a leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee in the 1960s and the youngest speaker at the 1963 March 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 13,664 (remarks by Rep. Jackson-Lee) (describing Rep. Lewis as “our own 
special icon and warrior for peace”). 
 339. Id. (“Might I first give my accolades and appreciation to the gentlewoman from the 
District of Columbia (Ms. NORTON) for her fight on the battlefield for civil rights . . . .”). 
 340. Id. at 13,663 (remarks by Rep. Lewis). 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
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on Washington, received the Medal of Freedom for his work in the 
civil rights movement and his work in Congress.345
Lewis refers to a revolution of values and ideas.  An African-
American representative from a later generation, Artur Davis of Ala-
bama, referred to himself and similar representatives as the “legatees” 
as well as “the hope of what was done here 40 years ago,” that chang-
ing the law could “build an America that had never been.”
 
346  Davis 
and other speakers also referred to the morality of the Act.  Davis re-
fers to using “the power of law to shape the American dream” and 
that, contrary to the “fashionable” claim that “you cannot legislate 
morality in this country,” the Act shows that “law can be used to shape 
our moral character; law can be used to set the boundaries of what we 
will tolerate and what we will not accept.”347  Another speaker praised 
the leaders who championed the Act as “visionaries armed with a truly 
moral cause,” quoting Senator Everett Dirksen on the point that the 
Act was “essentially moral in character.”348
In an echo of Lewis’s statement about finally laying down the 
burdens of race, another Congressman reminded lawmakers that the 
Supreme Court, in the nineteenth century, had struck down the “pro-
totypical form” of the Act, but “[i]n 1964, the Congress acted and we 
made it stick.”
 
349  “[F]inally,” with this Act, America could send a mes-
sage to the world about protecting individual “freedom not only from 
outside aggressors, but from those in your own country who would 
deny employment benefits to you or deny you access to a public place 
because of your race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”350  This is 
a striking parallel to the 1947 Presidential report, which noted that 
the greatest threats to civil rights could come from private individuals 
and groups.351
[W]ith this enactment, the United States finally established 
in permanent, positive law the fulfillment of the vision of the 
grand words of our founders; that our Nation would not 
  The 1964 Act, thus, helped America live up to its 
founding ideals:  
 
 345. Kori Schulman, President Obama Honors Presidential Medal of Freedom Recipients, THE 
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 15, 2011, 10:53 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ 
2011/02/15/watch-live-president-obama-honors-presidential-medal-freedom-recipients 
(describing John Lewis as “a giant of the Civil Rights movement”). 
 346. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,665 (remarks of Rep. Davis). 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 13,666 (remarks of Rep. Visclosky). 
 349. Id. at 13,664 (statement of Rep. Cox). 
 350. Id. 
 351. Lawson, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 290, at 109. 
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treat its citizens differently any more than they are treated 
differently in the eyes of God, their creator.352
One speaker explicitly sounded the theme that the segregation 
the Act attacked was part of “the legacy of slavery,” which the Act 
“brought us closer to dismantling;” he also noted “de facto discrimi-
nation [that] continues to pervade many of our institutions,” and ob-
served that there are still forms of second class citizenship that re-
quire national attention.
 
353  Because the Act also included a historic 
prohibition on sex discrimination in employment, speakers drew 
analogies between race and sex in terms of their narratives of progress 
made—and progress still to be made—by 1964354 and even by 2004.355
Now I turn to the lone objector to the resolution: Representative 
Ron Paul, father of current Senator Rand Paul and a candidate for 
the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, explained that he 
joined his “colleagues in urging Americans to celebrate the progress 
this country has made in race relations.”
 
356  However, he continued, 
contrary to the claims of the supporters of the Civil Rights Act and 
supporters of the commemorative resolution, “the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 did not improve race relations or enhance freedom.”357
Instead, the forced integration dictated by the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 increased racial tensions while diminishing indi-
vidual liberty. 
  While 
Paul did not explicitly refer to involuntary servitude, the language of 
coercion and force—as well as impingement on private property 
rights—is prominent in his objection:  
 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave the federal government 
unprecedented power over the hiring, employee relations, 
and customer service practices of every business in the coun-
try.  The result was a massive violation of the rights of private 
property and contract, which are the bedrocks of free socie-
 
 352. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,663 (statement of Rep. Cox). 
 353. Id. at 13,666 (statement of Rep. Cummings). 
 354. Id. at 13,663–64 (statement of Rep. Cox). 
 355. Id. at 13,664–65 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (calling attention to “the progress 
we have yet to make in order to fulfill the tenets of [the] Civil Rights Act of 1964,” such as 
voting rights problems in her home state of Texas). 
 356. Id. at 13,667 (statement of Rep. Paul). 
 357. Id. Thanks to Garrett Epps for pointing this historical parallel out to me.  See Gar-
rett Epps, Rand Paul’s American Mistake: Taking ‘New’ for ‘Unconstitutional,’ THE ATLANTIC 
(May 25, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/print/2010/05/rand-pauls-
american-mistake-taking-new-for-unconstiutional/57246/ (observing that Rand Paul was 
“channelling ancestral voices” when he “blundered into arguing that the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 was somehow constitutionally suspect”). 
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ty.  The federal government has no legitimate authority to 
infringe on the rights of private property owners to use their 
property as they please and to form (or not form) contracts 
with terms mutually agreeable to all parties.  The rights of all 
private property owners, even those whose actions decent 
people find abhorrent, must be respected if we are to main-
tain a free society.358
In this passage, Paul’s conception of both what it means to have a 
“free society” and of private property rights is similar to that asserted 
by Senator Strom Thurmond in opposition to the 1964 Act.
 
359  Thur-
mond (as discussed above) explicitly condemned Title II as involunta-
ry servitude and countered with a conception of private property on 
which “an individual may be ‘irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even un-
just in his personal relations’ and still be free from arbitrary govern-
mental interference.”360  Thurmond asserted that voluntary desegre-
gation was the only kind that would be successful, just as Paul asserted 
that progress in race relations was “due to changes in public attitudes 
and private efforts,” not because of the Act. Paul also challenged 
Congress’s “erroneous interpretation” of its power to regulate inter-
state commerce.361
Writing several years before this congressional resolution, Reva 
Siegel and Robert Post argued that the “protracted struggle” culmi-
nating in the passage of the 1964 Act “fundamentally altered the ways 
in which Americans reasoned about national power, changing under-
standings of both federalism and liberty.”
 
362  Pertinent here is their 
contention that “[b]efore 1964, it was still commonplace for public 
figures like Robert Bork and Milton Friedman to decry the prospect 
of federal interference with the freedom of business owners to discri-
minate in their choice of customers or employees, and to equate it 
with McCarthyism, communism, fascism, socialism, involuntary servi-
tude, or worse.”  Those types of “public and prominent objections to 
federal enforcement of antidiscrimination norms now sound like 
voices from another world.”363
 
 358. 40th Anniversary, supra note 
   
333, at 13,667 (statement of Rep. Paul). 
 359. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 46. 
 360. Id. at 52 (quoting Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963)). 
 361. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,667. 
 362. Post, supra note 113, at 492. 
 363. Id. at 492–93 (footnote omitted).  Epps discusses this observation in the context of 
drawing parallels between objections to the 1964 Act and to the recent federal health care 
law. Epps, supra note 357. 
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In 2004, Representative Paul rooted his objections not in any ex-
plicit “ism” so much as “diminishing individual liberty” and (corres-
pondingly) overweening bureaucratic and judicial control.364  He was, 
after all, the sole “nay” vote, which tends to confirm “the fundamental 
changes wrought by the second Reconstruction,” of which the 1964 
Act was a significant part.365
In 2010, controversy erupted when Rand Paul, son of Represent-
ative Paul and winner of the Kentucky Republican primary for U.S. 
Senate (with the support of the Tea Party), made public statements 
that seemed critical of Title II and supportive of a right of private 
businesses to take race into account in deciding whether to serve cus-
tomers.
   
366  For Paul, the problem rested in the notion that govern-
ment could tell a privately owned business what to do.  In a newspaper 
interview, Paul was asked whether it would be okay not to serve Dr. 
Martin Luther King at the Woolworth’s counter.367  His answer is stri-
kingly similar to Thurmond’s and his father’s answer in terms of his 
conception of what a “free society” must tolerate: “I would not go to 
that Woolworth’s, and I would stand up in my community and say it’s 
abhorrent,” he responded.  “In a free society, we will tolerate boorish 
people who have abhorrent behavior.  But if we’re civilized people, we 
publicly criticize that and don’t belong to those groups or associate 
with those people.”368
In subsequent interviews, Paul elaborated on his views, stressing 
the public or private distinction and his preference for local rather 
than federal solutions.
 
369
Well, what it gets into then is if you decide that restaurants 
are publicly owned and not privately owned, then do you say 
that you should have the right to bring your gun into a res-
taurant even though the owner of the restaurant says, “Well, 
no, we don’t want to have guns in here”; the bar says, “We 
  On MSNBC, Paul answered Rachel Mad-
dow’s question about desegregating lunch counters with an odd anal-
ogy to prohibiting guns in restaurants: 
 
 364. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,667 (statement of Rep. Paul). 
 365. Post, supra note 113, at 493. 
 366. Joseph Gerth, Rand Paul Embroiled in Civil Rights Controversy over Remarks Made on 
Courier-Journal Video Interview, COURIER-JOURNAL.COM (May 20, 2010), http://www.courier-
journal.com/article/20100520/NEWS0101/5200351/Rand-Paul-embroiled-Civil-Rights-
controversy-over-remarks-made-Courier-Journal-video-interview. 
 367. Id.  
 368. Id.  
 369. Ken Rudin, Rand Paul in Civil Rights Bill Firestorm, NPR.ORG (May 20, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/politicaljunkie/2010/05/20/127009788/kentucky-gop-unity-
rally-on-saturday-mongiardo-d-won-t-seek-recanvass.  
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don’t want to have guns in here because people might drink 
and start fighting and shoot each other.”  Does the owner of 
the restaurant own his restaurant?  Or does the government 
own his restaurant?  These are important philosophical de-
bates but not a very practical discussion.370
In the face of a firestorm over his various remarks about the Civil 
Rights Act, Paul issued a statement that (1) clarified his support for 
the Civil Rights Act and disavowed any intent to repeal it; (2) ac-
knowledged that the constitutional issues surrounding the Act were 
debated at the time and settled by judges; (3) acknowledged the long 
and unfinished struggle for civil rights; while also (4) condemning 
“overreaching” by the federal government, most recently in health 
care: 
 
 I believe we should work to end all racism in American so-
ciety and staunchly defend the inherent rights of every per-
son. . . .   
 Let me be clear: I support the Civil Rights Act because I 
overwhelmingly agree with the intent of the legislation, 
which was to stop discrimination in the public sphere and 
halt the abhorrent practice of segregation and Jim Crow 
laws. 
. . .  [S]ections of the Civil Rights Act were debated on Con-
stitutional grounds when the legislation was passed. Those 
issues have been settled by federal courts in the intervening 
years. 
 . . . . 
 The issue of civil rights is one with a tortured history in this 
country.  We have made great strides, but there is still work 
to be done to ensure the great promise of Liberty is granted 
to all Americans.371
And finally, Paul struck a different concluding note about the risks of 
overreaching federal governmental power and warned that liberty is 
threatened by regulation: 
 
This much is clear: The federal government has far over-
reached in its power grabs.  Just look at the recent national 
healthcare schemes, which my opponent supports.  The fed-
eral government, for the first time ever, is mandating that 
individuals purchase a product.  The federal government is 
 
 370. Id.  
 371. Id.  
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out of control, and those who love liberty and value individ-
ual and state’s rights must stand up to it.372
G.  A Question of Baseline: Property Rights and Duties and 
Understandings of Freedom 
 
For Rand Paul, private property ownership translates into an en-
titlement to be free from federal regulation, which threatens liberty 
and individual and state’s rights.  That is his baseline. His public 
statement, thus, condemns Jim Crow laws and supports stopping dis-
crimination “in the public sphere.”  Although this public statement is 
silent on the question of private discrimination, his earlier, more con-
troversial remarks—and writings—insist on the significance of the 
public/private distinction, and that “[a] free society will abide unoffi-
cial, private discrimination,” including exclusion on the basis of skin 
color.373  Of course, Title II treated only certain private establishments 
as public accommodations, just as contemporary state public accom-
modations laws—although often more expansive than Title II—do 
not treat every private entity as a public accommodation.374
In the debates over Title II, many proponents viewed the relevant 
baseline as the common law duty of innkeepers and certain other ent-
ities to serve the public.  The Senate Report stressed that “the re-
quirement that public accommodations and facilities serving the gen-
eral public do so without racial or religious discrimination is neither 
new nor novel” and asserted that “[t]he doctrines that to a large ex-
tent sustain this result are deeply rooted in English common law but 
by no means limited to common carriers.”
   
375  The Report devoted 
considerable space to rebutting the claim that private property rights 
are absolute and bar a public accommodations law (some of which 
Justice Douglas quotes in his concurrence, as discussed in Part II).376  
Implicitly, it rejected any notion that a duty to serve the public with-
out discrimination when one operates a business “in which the public 
has an interest” is a form of involuntary servitude.377
 
 372. Id.  
  But the Report 
 373. Gerth, supra note 366 (quoting Paul’s 2002 letter to the editor of the Bowling Green 
Daily News: “A free society will abide unofficial, private discrimination . . . even when that 
means allowing hate-filled groups to exclude people based on the color of their skin.  It is 
unenlightened and ill-informed to promote discrimination against individuals based on 
the color of their skin.  It is likewise unwise to forget the distinction between public (tax-
payer-financed) and private entities.” (alteration in original)). 
 374. Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 168, at 1414–15.  
 375. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 9. 
 376. Id. at 22–23. 
 377. Id. at 9–10. 
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also noted how, in the late nineteenth century and well into the twen-
tieth century, states adopted laws that abrogated this common law du-
ty and even, in some instances, required segregation.378  Similarly, 
when Attorney General Robert Kennedy testified in support of the 
bill, he provided a list of the various state laws mandating segrega-
tion.379  As Kennedy did, the Senate Report also pointed out the in-
congruity that, while private property rights now were invoked as sup-
posed constitutional barriers to Title II, “the right of the private 
property owner to serve or sell to whom he pleased was never claimed 
when laws were enacted prohibiting the private property owner from 
dealing with persons of a particular race.”380  Congress viewed a na-
tional law as necessary because, although a majority of states now had 
laws protecting against racial discrimination in access to public ac-
commodations, eighteen did not.381  Indeed, noting that President 
Truman’s 1947 report recommended that states enact public accom-
modations laws (at that time eighteen states had such laws), the Se-
nate Report (as noted above) stated: “This bill, then, is the second at-
tempt to achieve Federal legislation and the third time equal access to 
public accommodations has been recommended as a national 
goal.”382
As Joseph Singer exhaustively demonstrates, “[t]he legal treat-
ment of public accommodations is ambiguous, changing, and con-
fused from after the Civil War until the start of the Jim Crow era in 
the 1880s”—the era during which Congress passed the 1875 Act and 
the Court struck the Act down.
  
383  This was due in part to some states 
retrenching on the common law obligation either by abrogating it 
completely384 or by courts interpreting it to permit racial segregation 
in providing services.385
 
 378. Id. at 10. 
  Noting these developments, Singer calls Jus-
tice Bradley’s statement in the Civil Rights Cases about the current 
state of state laws concerning innkeepers and public carriers (“In-
nkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we 
are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish prop-
er accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith 
 379. Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 2, supra note 321, at 20–21 (putting into record “State or 
Local Laws Compelling Racial Segregation in Public Accommodations”). 
 380. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. at 11. 
 383. Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 168, at 1353–54. 
 384. Id. at 1386–88. 
 385. Id. at 1367–73. 
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apply for them”) “shocking” in its “disingenuousness.”386
The confused state of public accommodations law in that era was 
also due to tension between competing legal understandings of prop-
erty rights, with one baseline being an absolutist right to exclude and 
the other, invoked by Congress a century later, being that when one 
hangs out a sign, one invites in the public and cannot exclude for ar-
bitrary reasons.  The first baseline would permit posting the “whites” 
and “colored” signs so pervasive in segregation; the latter would 
not.
 With the ad-
vent of Jim Crow laws, states required segregation.  
387  Singer observes, “American law now contains a fundamental 
background principle of equality in the rules governing the market-
place.  Congress has made this clear.”388  Singer links this baseline to 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery as well as to civil 
rights statutes.  Contrary to the conception of “liberty” and a “free so-
ciety” articulated by Title II’s critics and, more recently, by Rand Paul, 
Singer contends: “Civil rights statutes are not intrusive interferences 
with liberty. They are what make us a free and democratic society.”389
Our constitutions, statutes, and common law protect our 
democracy from devolving into a racial caste society, feudal 
society, or a patriarchy.  This protection comes from setting 
minimum standards for economic relationships compatible 
with the norms of a free and democratic society that treats 
every person with equal concern and respect.
  
He elaborates:  
390
Contrary to the notion of what a free society must tolerate, how-
ever odious, Singer argues that “[s]egregation and exclusion on the 
basis of race are outside the bounds of acceptable conduct by owners 
and operators of public accommodations in a free and democratic so-
ciety;” they are inconsistent with “our current settled convictions 
about the contours of economic relationships” in such a society.
 
391
 
 386. Id. at 1397–98 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 103 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)). 
  
Part of the legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel and the law it upheld is 
creating those settled convictions. 
 387. Id. at 1373. 
 388. Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle, supra note 199, at 109. 
 389. Id. at 107 (emphasis removed). 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 108.  Singer uses as an example the trouble Rand Paul got into because of his 
criticism of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Id. at 107. 
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IV.  THE LEGACY OF HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL FOR SUBSEQUENT 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND THEIR CRITICS 
What is the legacy of the Heart of Atlanta Motel case for later anti-
discrimination laws and challenges to them?  An instructive example 
of how salient themes in the majority and concurring opinions recur 
in subsequent jurisprudence is Roberts v. United States Jaycees.392  In this 
case, twenty years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Court’s 
upholding of its constitutionality, the Court upheld the application of 
Minnesota’s public accommodations law to the Jaycees against a con-
stitutional challenge that requiring the organization to admit women 
violated its rights to freedom of association.393  Several themes impor-
tant to the Heart of Atlanta Motel case recur in the Court’s analysis.  
First, and perhaps most important, is “dignity” and the analogy the 
Court draws between stigmatic harms based on race and sex discrimi-
nation.  The Court intermingles Minnesota’s concerns about protect-
ing its citizens “from a number of serious social and personal harms” 
with the Court’s own recognition, in its anti-stereotyping Equal Pro-
tection cases, about harms to dignity and to participation in society.394  
Citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, in which “we emphasized that [Title II’s] 
fundamental object . . . was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal 
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public es-
tablishments,’” the Court interchanges race and sex in its statements 
about the stigmatic injury due to denial of equal access to public es-
tablishments.395
A second interesting feature is the Court’s reference to the rela-
tionship between federal and state antidiscrimination laws and the 
long federal hiatus after the Civil Rights Cases.  The Court remarks 
upon the initiative of states in passing antidiscrimination laws in the 
absence of federal legislative efforts.  It observes: “The Minnesota 
Human Rights Act at issue here is an example of public accommoda-
tions laws that were adopted by some States beginning a decade be-
fore enactment of their federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of 
1875[.]”
   
396
 
 392. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
  Between the time the Supreme Court invalidated the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 and when Congress “reentered the field in 1957,” 
Minnesota’s civil rights laws, like those of many other states, was “the 
 393. Id. at 626. 
 394. Id. at 625. 
 395. Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 
(1964)) (alterations in both). 
 396. Id. at 624. 
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primary means for protecting the civil rights of historically disadvan-
taged groups.”397  The Court notes that, “[l]ike many other States, 
Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope of its public ac-
commodations law,” adding “sex” to the list of protected categories in 
1973.398
A third implicit parallel between the two cases is that the Court 
approves Minnesota’s adoption of “a functional definition of public 
accommodations that reaches various forms of public, quasi-
commercial conduct,” a definition reflecting the realities of a chang-
ing economy.
  
399  Heart of Atlanta Motel observed that “the conditions of 
transportation and commerce have changed dramatically” from 1875, 
such that the Court “must apply those principles to the present state 
of commerce” where “[t]he sheer increase in volume of interstate 
traffic alone would give discriminatory practices which inhibit travel a 
far larger impact upon the Nation’s commerce than such practices 
had on the economy of another day.”400  Citing to its own sex-
discrimination precedents in support, the Roberts Court states that 
“[t]his expansive definition reflects a recognition of the changing na-
ture of the American economy and of the importance, both to the in-
dividual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic ad-
vancement and political and social integration that have historically 
plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women.”401  The 
Court accepts the Minnesota court’s explanation that the local chap-
ters of the Jaycees are “‘place[s] of public accommodations’” because 
of “the various commercial programs and benefits offered to mem-
bers,” such that “‘[l]eadership skills are ‘goods,’ [and] business con-
tacts and employment promotions are ‘privileges’ and ‘advantag-
es.’”402  The Supreme Court concludes: “Assuring women equal access 
to such goods, privileges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling 
state interests.”403
A fourth parallel concerns the issue of harm to the entity treated 
as a public accommodation.  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court ob-
served that evidence was to the contrary on the owner’s claim that in-
tegration would harm his business, but even if there was some harm, 
 
 
 397. Id.  
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. at 625–26. 
 400. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 251. 
 401. 468 U.S. at 626. 
 402. Id. at 626 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W. 2d 
764, 772 (Minn. 1981)). 
 403. Id. 
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that was constitutional.404  The type of harm alleged in Roberts was 
harm from forced inclusion of women as members.405  The Court in 
Roberts—and subsequently in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. 
Rotary Club of Duarte406 and New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of 
New York407—opined that forcing an all-male group to accept female 
members would not significantly burden it or its ability to convey mes-
sages.408  But the Court went on to assert that even if the public ac-
commodations law “causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees’ 
protected speech, that effect is no greater than is necessary to accom-
plish the State’s legitimate purposes.”409  Here the Court, in another 
parallel to Heart of Atlanta Motel, turns to the language of discrimina-
tion as an evil that government may prevent: “As we have explained, 
acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly availa-
ble goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that gov-
ernment has a compelling interest to prevent—wholly apart from the 
point of view such conduct may transmit.”410  By contrast, the Court 
reached a different conclusion in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale with re-
spect to New Jersey’s public accommodations law compelling the Boy 
Scouts to admit a homosexual as a scoutmaster: not only would that 
law unconstitutionally impair the Scouts’ ability to convey its messag-
es, but—the court summarily asserted—New Jersey’s interests did “not 
justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of 
expressive association.”411
I will now look briefly at how Heart of Atlanta Motel features in two 
recent Supreme Court opinions cutting back on the Court’s defe-
rence to Congress’s exercise of its commerce power, United States v. 
Lopez
 
412 and United States v. Morrison.413
 
 404. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260. 
  I will focus more on Morrison 
because it considered an antidiscrimination law, the civil rights reme-
dy portion of the Violence Against Women Act.  The majority and the 
dissents in these controversial decisions differ over the import of Heart 
of Atlanta Motel.  The majorities in Lopez and Morrison stress the need 
to distinguish the truly economic from the noneconomic and the tru-
ly national from the purely local and warn of Congress using the 
 405. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615.  
 406. 481 U.S. 537, 547 (1987). 
 407. 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).  
 408. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615, 627–29. 
 409. Id. at 628. 
 410. Id.  
 411. 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). 
 412. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 413. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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commerce power so as to “obliterate” such distinctions.414  Heart of At-
lanta Motel features in string citations for Congress’s power to “regu-
late the use of the channels of interstate commerce.”415
In Lopez, where the Court invalidated the federal Gun-Free 
School Zones Act, Heart of Atlanta Motel, along with McClung (the Ol-
lie’s Barbeque case), feature as instances where the Court has “upheld 
a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic ac-
tivity where we have concluded that the activity substantially affected 
interstate commerce.”
  
416  By contrast, the majority finds an insuffi-
cient impact on the national economy to warrant a federal law con-
cerning guns in schools.417  Concurring Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor offer Heart of Atlanta Motel as an “example[] of the exercise 
of federal power where commercial transactions were the subject of 
regulation” and reassure that this and other authorities are “within 
the fair ambit of the Court’s practical conception of commercial regu-
lation and are not called in question by our decision today.”418
Justice Souter’s dissent in Lopez cites Heart of Atlanta Motel and 
McClung to highlight the proper deference the Court should give to 
Congress, under rational basis review, once it “find[s] that the legisla-
tors, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational 
basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protec-
tion of commerce.”
  
419  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, he explains, “with the 
challenge to congressional Commerce Clause authority to prohibit 
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation . . . the Court 
simply made explicit” the deferential test implicit in its earlier prece-
dents.420  Justice Souter warns of the “backward glance,” at the end of 
the century, toward the Court’s “untenable” jurisprudence from the 
Lochner era, pointing to its reliance on problematic distinctions be-
tween the commercial and noncommercial.421
In Justice Breyer’s dissent (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg), Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung appear as cases in 
which the Court recognized that a problem of discrimination could 
have economic and personal harm.  Thus, the Court upheld the law 
  
 
 414. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616–18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 567–68.  
 415. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 256 (1964)); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (same). 
 416. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
 417. Id. at 567. 
 418. Id. at 573–74 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 419. Id. at 607 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. at 608. 
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in McClung “in part because that discrimination discouraged travel by 
African Americans and in part because that discrimination affected 
purchases of food and restaurant supplies from other States.”422  In 
those cases, Justice Breyer writes, “the Court understood that the spe-
cific instance of discrimination (at a local place of accommodation) 
was part of a general practice that, considered as a whole, caused not 
only the most serious human and social harm, but had nationally sig-
nificant economic dimensions as well.”423  He argues that similar hu-
man and social harms and national economic consequences stem 
from “local instances” of school violence, “taken together and consi-
dered as a whole.”424  Further, he argues that upholding the law as 
under the commerce power would, as in Heart of Atlanta Motel, “simp-
ly . . . apply pre-existing law to changing economic circumstances.”425
In Morrison, the majority struck down the civil rights remedy por-
tion (concerning gender-motivated acts of violence) of the Violence 
Against Women Act (“VAWA”).
  
426  Referencing Lopez, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist repeats its invocation of Heart of Atlanta Motel for the points 
that “Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce” and that the Court has upheld a “wide variety of congres-
sional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where [it has] con-
cluded that the activity substantially affected commerce.”427  The 
Court goes on to conclude that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of vi-
olence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”428  In 
Lopez, the Court said Congress lacked sufficient findings, but here, the 
VAWA provision before the Court “is supported by numerous findings 
regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on 
victims and their families.”429
 
 422. Id. at 626 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
  However, findings alone are not 
enough, for as Lopez teaches (citing Justice Black’s concurring opi-
nion in Heart of Atlanta Motel): “‘[w]hether particular operations affect 
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional 
power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than 
 423. Id.  
 424. Id. at 626–27. 
 425. Id. at 624–25. 
 426. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (“Congress’ effort . . . to pro-
vide a federal civil remedy can be sustained neither under the Commerce Clause nor un-
der § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 427. Id. at 609, 610 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 428. Id. at 613. 
 429. Id. at 614 (emphasis in original). 
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a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.’”430  
In an often-criticized passage, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserts: “The 
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and 
what is truly local,” concluding that “[t]he regulation and punishment 
of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, 
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been 
the province of the States.”431  Morever, the Civil Rights Cases opinion 
makes an appearance as still “good law” on the need for there to be 
state action to trigger the protections of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.432
In a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Jus-
tice Souter observes that “the legislative record here is far more volu-
minous than the record compiled by Congress and found sufficient in 
two prior cases upholding Title II”: Heart of Atlanta Motel and 
McClung.
 
433  He notes that “Congress had relied on compelling anec-
dotal reports that individual instances of segregation cost thousands 
to millions of dollars,” and also had “evidence” about the differential 
spending of the average black and white family, attributed in signifi-
cant part to discrimination.434  When Congress built a record concern-
ing VAWA, it relied on estimates in dollar costs (in the billions) of the 
harms of domestic violence.435
Equally important [to the cost estimates], gender-based vi-
olence in the 1990’s was shown to operate in a manner simi-
lar to racial discrimination in the 1960’s in reducing the 
mobility of employees and their production and consump-
tion of goods shipped in interstate commerce.  Like racial 
discrimination, “[g]ender-based violence bars its most likely 
  But Justice Souter also stresses the 
human costs, pointing out how, in building the record for VAWA, 
Congress noted analogies between racial discrimination and gender-
based violence:  
 
 430. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 & n.2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring))). 
 431. Id. at 617–18 (citations omitted). 
 432. See id. at 624–26 (noting that the VAWA “is not aimed at proscribing discrimination 
by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it is directed not 
at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated 
by gender bias”). 
 433. Id. at 635 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. (noting that in 1994, Congress relied “on evidence of the harms caused by do-
mestic violence and sexual assault, citing annual costs of $3 billion in 1990 . . . and $5 to 
$10 billion in 1993”). 
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targets—women—from full partic[ipation] in the national 
economy.”436
Justice Souter asserts that, until Lopez, VAWA “would have passed 
muster” in the period “in which the law enjoyed a stable understand-
ing” of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
 
437 He observes 
that “this understanding was secure even against the turmoil at the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”438  Indeed, in the “aftermath” 
of that turmoil, the Court “not only reaffirmed” that stable under-
standing, but also “declined to limit the commerce power through a 
formal distinction between legislation focused on ‘commerce’ and 
statutes addressing ‘moral and social wrong[s].’”439
In Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
(in certain parts) Ginsburg, he takes the majority to task for its unten-
able distinction between “economic” and “noneconomic” activities.
 
440  
He enlists Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung at several points, not on-
ly to illustrate the difficulty of drawing such a line but also to demon-
strate Congress’s authority “‘to keep the channels of interstate com-
merce free from immoral and injurious uses.’”441
We live in a Nation knit together by two centuries of scientif-
ic, technological, commercial, and environmental change.  
Those changes, taken together, mean that virtually every 
kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect 
commerce, or its conditions, outside the State—at least 
when considered in the aggregate.
  Justice Breyer also 
enlists Heart of Atlanta Motel in his critique of the majority’s distinction 
between truly local and truly national activity in light of an increasing-
ly interconnected nation: 
442
 
 436. Id. at 635–36 (citation omitted). 
  
 437. Id. at 637. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v. United States, 397 U.S. 241, 257 
(1964)).  This “stable understanding” is that “the Commerce Clause, complemented by the 
authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause, . . . extended to all activity that, when aggre-
gated, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. 
 440. Id. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 441. Id. at 656–58 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 256). 
 442. Id. at 660 (citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 251).  Finally, although Justice Breyer 
would sustain the VAWA provision at issue under the Commerce Clause, and does not 
reach the question of Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(also reminiscent of the Heart of Atlanta Motel Court), he questions the relevance of the 
Civil Rights Cases to the instant case.  Id. at 664.  The 1883 case held that Section 5 “does 
not authorize Congress to use the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of power to remedy 
the conduct of private persons,” but the federal government’s argument about the VAWA 
civil rights remedy is that it aimed to remedy actions of “state actors”—the documented fail-
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The Court’s sharp departure from deference to Congress’s 
judgments about its exercise of the commerce power to address signif-
icant moral and social evils with national economic dimensions makes 
the prudential strategy adopted by Congress in enacting Title II—and 
supported by the Court in upholding Title II—now seem all the more 
historic.  The fate of the commerce power in such decisions has also 
sparked considerable discussion by scholars of more robust under-
standing and employment of the Fourteenth Amendment, including 
the Citizenship Clause (championed so long ago by Senator Prou-
ty).443  Perhaps such examination might fruitfully include the poten-
tial of the Thirteenth Amendment, which, I have argued, played a 
significant, if underappreciated, role in the passage of the 1964 feder-
al public accommodations law444
V.  CONCLUSION  
  
An aim of this Article was to draw attention to the contrasting 
ways that arguments about the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
on slavery and involuntary servitude played a role in the enactment of 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. 
v. United States, in which the United States Supreme Court upheld that 
public accommodations law.  The hotel owner, like some members of 
Congress who opposed Title II, alleged that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was a bar to Title II, because compelling business owners to 
serve customers constituted involuntary servitude.  This Article de-
tailed the rejection of that argument by Justice Department officials 
arguing for the bill before Congress as well by a unanimous Supreme 
Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel.  It examined Congressional under-
standings of property rights that viewed antidiscrimination law as a 
proper measure to secure the equal rights of all, rather than as an un-
constitutional trampling upon private property rights.  
The second role played by the Thirteenth Amendment, barely 
discernible in Heart of Atlanta Motel, but readily evident in the Con-
gressional hearings on Title II and in the Senate Report, was as an 
appropriate constitutional foundation for a public accommodations 
 
ure of states “to provide adequate (or any) state remedies for women injured by gender-
motivated violence.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 443. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.  Reva Siegel and Robert Post come to 
mind in these efforts.  See supra note 363 and accompanying text. 
 444. Cf. Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 
DUKE L.J. 1609, 1684 (2001) (retrieving “lost story” of the role of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and involuntary servitude in the Department of Justice Civil Rights Section’s ap-
proach to free labor in its civil rights practice of the 1940s and 1950s). 
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law because denial of service on the basis of race was a badge and in-
cident of servitude and a vestige of slavery.  On the one hand, the At-
torney General and various lawmakers argued that, in light of the fate 
of the public accommodations law of 1875, struck down in the Civil 
Rights Cases, the prudent, pragmatic course was to rest Title II on 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, rather than on the 
Reconstruction Amendments.  Indeed, although Congress did rest 
the law on the commerce power and the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court upheld the law solely on the basis of the commerce power, thus 
avoiding the need to rule on whether Congress’s remaining authority 
for the law was adequate.  On the other hand, in explaining why the 
law was necessary and an urgent moral imperative, the Attorney Gen-
eral and some lawmakers appealed to the Thirteenth Amendment 
and argued that such a law was necessary to fulfill the promises of Re-
construction and to remedy the forms of unequal citizenship expe-
rienced daily by millions of African-Americans in the United States.  
Indeed, some members of Congress would have grounded the bill 
more explicitly on the Thirteenth Amendment to clarify what they 
viewed as the crux of the matter.  To read Heart of Atlanta Motel in iso-
lation from its historical context is to miss this significant role played 
by the Thirteenth Amendment.  
As I have illustrated by supplementing my analysis of that case 
with an examination of contemporary news accounts and legal com-
mentary, a significant part of the legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel was 
that the Court did uphold Title II and that this new federal civil rights 
law did not meet the fate of its 1875 predecessor.  Public officials as 
well as civil rights activists enlisted this unanimous decision as signal-
ing that the nation spoke in a unified voice and that the Civil Rights 
Act, passed after lengthy and often fractious debate in Congress, sig-
naled a milestone in securing long-overdue full and equal citizenship 
for African-Americans.  The Court’s upholding of Title II, thus, is an 
example of institutional branches cooperating and reinforcing each 
other, rather than the Court stymieing legislative efforts to fulfill the 
promise of the Reconstruction Amendments.  To borrow a phrase 
from Jack Balkin, we could view the passage of Title II and the Court’s 
upholding of it as an example of “constitutional redemption”: 
through the efforts of social and political movements to redeem the 
unfulfilled promises of the Constitution, Congress enacted a law that 
officially repudiated racial segregation in public accommodations, 
and the Court lent its imprimatur to this new vision of the Constitu-
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tion and of the meaning of equality.445
In upholding Title II, the Court also rejected—as did Congress in 
enacting Title II—a vision of the Constitution under which rights to 
liberty and private property were an absolute entitlement to be free 
from regulations and to engage in arbitrary discrimination.  On that 
repudiated view, legislation forbidding racial discrimination in serving 
the public was a form of compelled—hence, involuntary—servitude.  
Instead, such civil rights laws further the goal, as Joseph Singer ar-
gues, of a “free and democratic society,” in which there is a “funda-
mental background principle of equality in the rules governing the 
marketplace.”
  As I have discussed, when 
Congress commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the Civil Rights 
Act, it interpreted the passage of the law in these same terms of re-
deeming a promise and completing the unfinished business of Re-
construction, even if Congress pragmatically grounded Title II in its 
ample authority under the commerce power.   
446
What is the legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel and of the enactment 
of Title II for newer generations of antidiscrimination laws and chal-
lenges to them?  Part of the value of retrieving the complex role of 
the Thirteenth Amendment in this context is to appreciate the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as an effort by Congress to complete the unfi-
nished business of Reconstruction.  Nonetheless, I have also suggested 
that several themes in the majority and concurring opinions in that 
case have resonance for more recent public accommodations laws 
that bar discrimination on such bases as sex and sexual orientation.  
These include the following ideas: (1) persons suffer dignitary harm 
when they are denied goods and services; (2) discrimination in public 
accommodations imposes economic and human costs; (3) antidiscri-
mination laws address moral evils; (4) conceptions of commerce and 
what affects it must take into account the changing nature of the 
economy; and (5) antidiscrimination law properly resolves the clash 
of rights in a way that furthers the equal basic liberties and freedom of 
all citizens. 
 
One argument made against Title II—both at that time and more 
recently—is that a “free society” must tolerate discrimination.447
 
 445. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 121–23 (2011) (describing the 
rhetoric of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and arguing that “the language of the 
unpaid debt, or the promises yet unfulfilled to be kept in the future, is the most natural 
metaphor of hope for eventual constitutional redemption”).  
  Pub-
lic accommodations laws reflect a different value judgment with re-
 446. Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle, supra note 199, at 107, 109.  
 447. See supra  text accompanying notes 358–359 and 368.  
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spect to entities deemed to be “places of public accommodations.”448  
Looking at more recent challenges to public accommodations laws, a 
frequent scenario is that such laws forbid discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation or marital/civil union status, and a merchant ar-
gues that compelling him or her to serve a same-sex couple violates 
constitutional rights to free exercise of religion or freedom of associa-
tion.  Or a religious entity deemed a public accommodation for cer-
tain purposes argues that it should be exempted from serving same-
sex couples.  Both those who argue that refusing service is justifiable 
and those who argue that it is not look back to the civil rights move-
ment and an earlier generation of civil rights laws, but draw different 
conclusions about their import for these more recent conflicts.  For 
example, the conservative Christian proclamation, The Manhattan Dec-
laration, criticizes “the use of anti-discrimination statutes to force reli-
gious institutions, businesses, and service providers of various sorts to 
comply with activities they judge to be deeply immoral or go out of 
business.”  Having to serve same-sex couples, despite religious objec-
tions to homosexual relationships, is a prime example.  The Manhattan 
Declaration appeals to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from a Bir-
mingham Jail to support the place of civil disobedience and to resist 
laws “that purport to compel citizens to do what is unjust.”449  This 
statement does not explicitly invoke the Thirteenth Amendment, but 
the notion of compelled service may bring involuntary servitude to 
mind.  By contrast, supporters of the right of same-sex couples to ob-
tain goods and services invoke Heart of Atlanta Motel to emphasize that 
public accommodations laws seek to remedy the dignitary harms that 
flow from the denial of service; they argue that those who choose to 
engage in commerce must abide by the rules.450
These competing invocations of the legacy of an earlier era’s civil 
rights struggles and legislative enactments highlight the continuing 
importance of assessing the import of this legacy.  As my discussion of 
how the Roberts v. United States Jaycees Court deployed Heart of Atlanta 
Motel suggested, one vital part of this challenge is examining the role 
of analogy between race discrimination and other forms of discrimi-
nation, such as that based on sex or sexual orientation.  That is a task 
   
 
 448. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN., Civil Rights, Title 10, § 10.5-5 (defining “place of public 
accommodation” broadly). 
 449. Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience, November 20, 2009, at 
http://manhattandeclaration.org/the-declaration/read.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2011). 
 450. See, e.g., Chai Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 149, at 123, 152–53 & 281 n.131. 
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in which I, like many others, am currently engaged.451
 
 451. See Linda C. McClain, Religious and Political Virtues and Values in Congruence or Con-
flict?: On Smith, Bob Jones University, and Christian Legal Society, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1959 (2011); JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND 
VIRTUES (book in progress); see also Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from 
Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007) (exploring how the distinctive histories of 
civil rights movements addressing race, sex, and sexual orientation might explain the dif-
ferent rules concerning religious exemptions to antidiscrimination laws on these three 
bases). 
  My hope is that 
this Article might be of some small assistance to others engaged in 
that necessary work. 
